<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&issue_date=June 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Tarun</gnm><snm>Khanna</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Yishay</gnm><snm>Yafeh</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>331</ppf>
<ppl>372</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Diversified business groups, consisting of legally independent firms operating across
diverse industries, are ubiquitous in emerging markets. Groups around the world
share certain attributes but also vary substantially in structure, ownership, and other
dimensions. This paper proposes a business group taxonomy, which is used to formulate
hypotheses and present evidence about the reasons for the formation, prevalence,
and evolution of groups in different environments. In interpreting the evidence, the
authors pay particular attention to two aspects neglected in much of the literature: the
circumstances under which groups emerge and the historical evidence on some of the
questions addressed by recent studies. They argue that business groups are responses
to different economic conditions and that, from a welfare standpoint, they can sometimes
be "paragons" and, at other times, "parasites." The authors conclude with an
agenda for future research.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&article=1&issue_date=June 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.2.331</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&issue_date=June 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Automobile Externalities and Policies</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Ian W. H. </gnm><snm>Parry</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Margaret</gnm><snm>Walls</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Winston</gnm><snm>Harrington</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>373</ppf>
<ppl>399</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper discusses the nature, and magnitude, of externalities associated with
automobile use, including local and global pollution, oil dependence, traffic congestion
and traffic accidents. It then discusses current federal policies affecting these
externalities, including fuel taxes, fuel economy and emissions standards, and alternative
fuel policies, summarizing, insofar as possible, the welfare effects of those policies.
Finally, we discuss emerging pricing policies, including congestion tolls, and
insurance reform, and summarize the appropriate combination of policies to address
automobile externalities.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&article=2&issue_date=June 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.2.373</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&issue_date=June 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Global Capital Markets in the Long Run: A Review of Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor’s <i>Global Capital Markets</i></ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jeffrey G.</gnm><snm>Williamson</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>400</ppf>
<ppl>409</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Written by Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor, <i>Global Capital Markets: Integration,
Crisis, and Growth</i> was a much-needed book that will be cited extensively by those
with interests in the long run evolution of the world financial capital market. The book
does not simply assess changes in the efficiency of global capital markets over the past
150 years, but rather adds significantly to debates about instability and crisis, asymmetry
between rich and poor countries in the costs of going open, the Lucas Paradox,
the connections between foreign exchange and financial capital market regimes, and
much more. The book makes far better use of the comparative evidence generated by
the three epochs since 1850—the first global century before 1914, the second global
century after 1950, and the autarchy in between—than do competitors that focus solely
on one regime, whether the gold standard, post–World War II Breton Woods, or the
float since. In addition, while the financial literature rarely assesses in any useful
empirical way the connection between financial markets and the real economy, this
book makes that connection absolutely clear. <i>Global Capital Markets</i> is a stimulating
book with a very wide and deep reach.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&article=3&issue_date=June 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.2.400</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&issue_date=June 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Review of Richard Layard, Stephen Nickell, and Richard Jackman’s <i>Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market</i></ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Olivier</gnm><snm>Blanchard</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>410</ppf>
<ppl>418</ppl>
</pp>
<ab><i>Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market</i> by Richard
Layard, Stephen Nickell, and Richard Jackman (Oxford University Press 2005) is the
second edition of a book first published in 1991. The second edition is identical to the
first except for a long introduction, which reviews the conclusions of the first edition
in the light of the following fifteen years. I basically agree with the authors that the
book’s framework and conclusions have withstood the test of time very well. I then
assess progress since 1991 and point to a number of directions in which progress
needs to be achieved.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&article=4&issue_date=June 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.2.410</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&issue_date=June 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Optimal Executive Compensation versus Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried’s <i>Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation</i></ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Michael S.</gnm><snm>Weisbach</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>419</ppf>
<ppl>428</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This essay reviews Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried’s <i>Pay without Performance:
The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation</i>. Bebchuk and Fried criticize the
standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts
with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate them to maximize the shareholders'
welfare. In contrast, Bebchuk and Fried argue that executive compensation
is more consistent with executives who control their own boards and who maximize
their own compensation subject to an "outrage constraint." They provide a host of
evidence consistent with this alternative viewpoint. The book can be evaluated from
both positive and normative perspectives. From a positive perspective, much of the
evidence they present, especially about the camouflage and risk-taking aspects of
executive compensation systems, is fairly persuasive. However, from a normative perspective,
the book conveys the idea that policy changes can dramatically improve
executive compensation systems and consequently overall corporate performance. It
is unclear to me how effective potential reforms designed to achieve such changes are
likely to be in practice.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&article=5&issue_date=June 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.2.419</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&issue_date=June 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Book Review</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Book Reviews</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>429</ppf>
<ppl>482</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&article=6&issue_date=June 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.2.429</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&issue_date=June 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Annotated Listing of New Books</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>483</ppf>
<ppl>578</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&article=7&issue_date=June 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.2.483</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>45</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2007</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&issue_date=June 2007</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>JEL Classification System</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>579</ppf>
<ppl>591</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=45&issue=2&article=8&issue_date=June 2007</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.45.2.579</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


