<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Graeme</gnm><snm>Guthrie</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>925</ppf>
<ppl>972</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The last thirty years have witnessed a fundamental change in the regulation of infrastructure
industries. Whereas firms were subject to rate of return regulation and protected
from entry in the past, they now face various forms of incentive regulation,
competition is actively promoted by many regulators, and both regulators and the
firms they regulate must often confront rapid technological progress. This paper surveys
the literature on the investment implications of different regulatory schemes,
highlighting the relevance of modern investment theory, which puts risk and intertemporal
issues, such as the irreversibility of much infrastructure investment, center
stage. It discusses the impact on regulated monopolists’ investment behavior of key
regulatory characteristics, namely the price flexibility allowed by the regulator, the
length of the regulatory cycle, and the costs the regulator will allow the firm to recover
at future regulatory hearings. It also considers the impact of competition, especially
the situation where a vertically integrated firm has its operation of a bottleneck
asset regulated, on investment by regulated firms and their competitors.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&article=2&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.4.925</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Gordon H.</gnm><snm>Hanson</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>869</ppf>
<ppl>924</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In this paper, I selectively review recent literature on illegal migration from Mexico to
the United States. I begin by discussing methods for estimating stocks and flows of
illegal migrants. While there is uncertainty about the size of the unauthorized population,
new data sources make it possible to examine the composition of legal and illegal
populations and the time-series covariates of illegal labor flows. I then consider
the supply of and demand for illegal migrants. Wage differentials between the United
States and Mexico are hardly a new phenomenon, yet illegal migration from Mexico
did not reach high levels until recently. An increase in the relative size of Mexico’s
working-age population, greater volatility in U.S.–Mexico relative wages, and
changes in U.S. immigration policies are all candidate explanations for increasing
labor flows from Mexico. Finally, I consider policies that regulate the cross-border
flow of illegal migrants. While U.S. laws mandate that authorities prevent illegal entry
and punish firms that hire unauthorized immigrants, these laws are imperfectly
enforced. Lax enforcement may reflect political pressure by employers and other
interests that favor open borders.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&article=1&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.4.869</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Back Matter</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>JEL Classification System</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1153</ppf>
<ppl>1165</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&article=8&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.4.1153</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Back Matter</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Doctoral Dissertations in Economics</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1166</ppf>
<ppl>1192</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&article=9&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.4.1166</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Back Matter</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Annotated Listing of New Books</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1081</ppf>
<ppl>1152</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&article=7&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.4.1081</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's <i>Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform</i></ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Dani</gnm><snm>Rodrik</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>973</ppf>
<ppl>987</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Proponents and critics alike agree that the policies spawned by the Washington
Consensus have not produced the desired results. The debate now is not over
whether the Washington Consensus is dead or alive, but over what will replace it. An
important marker in this intellectual terrain is the World Bank’s Economic Growth
in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (2005).With its emphasis on humility,
policy diversity, selective and modest reforms, and experimentation, this is a
rather extraordinary document demonstrating the extent to which the thinking of the
development policy community has been transformed over the years. But there are
other competing perspectives as well. One (trumpeted elsewhere in Washington) puts
faith on extensive institutional reform, and another (exemplified by the U.N.
Millennium Report) puts faith on foreign aid. Sorting intelligently among these
diverse perspectives requires an explicitly diagnostic approach that recognizes that
the binding constraints on growth differ from setting to setting.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&article=3&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.4.973</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>How Big a Problem is Too Big to Fail? A Review of Gary Stern and Ron Feldman's <i>Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts</i></ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Frederic S.</gnm><snm>Mishkin</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>988</ppf>
<ppl>1004</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This review essay examines whether too-big-to-fail is as serious a problem as Gary
Stern and Ron Feldman contend. This essay argues that Stern and Feldman overstate
the importance of the too-big-to-fail problem and do not give enough credit to the
FDICIA legislation of 1991 for improving bank regulation and supervision. However,
this criticism of the Stern and Feldman book does not detract from many of its messages.
The policy recommendations in their book have merit even if the too-big-to-fail
problem is currently not that serious because these policies make it less likely that a
banking crisis will occur even if driven by other factors.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&article=4&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.4.988</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Economics and the Biologists: A Review of Geerat J. Vermeij's <i>Nature: An Economic History</i></ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Joel</gnm><snm>Mokyr</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1005</ppf>
<ppl>1013</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This essay reviews and criticizes Vermeij’s Nature: An Economic History and places it
in the context of evolutionary economics. Vermeij presents a natural history written in
what he considers economic terms and argues that biologists should know more about
economics. While the exchanges between economics and biology can sometimes be
hazardous and misleading, quite a bit could be learned by economists from reading
this book.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&article=5&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.4.1005</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Book Reviews</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Book Reviews</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1014</ppf>
<ppl>1080</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=4&article=6&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.4.1014</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


