<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&issue_date=June 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Regulation, Competition and Liberalization</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Mark</gnm><snm>Armstrong</snm></au>
<au><gnm>David E.M.</gnm><snm>Sappington</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>325</ppf>
<ppl>366</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine
whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines
the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance
of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that
generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&article=1&issue_date=June 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.2.325</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&issue_date=June 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Dilip</gnm><snm>Mookherjee</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>367</ppf>
<ppl>390</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Separation of ownership from management, multidivisional firm organizations, delegation
of production decisions to worker teams, delegation of pricing and advertising decisions to
retail franchisers, reliance on intermediaries in trade or finance, and distribution of regulatory
authority across different agencies represent examples of organizations that delegate
and distribute decision-making authority instead of centralizing it. This paper reviews literature
on costs and benefits of delegated decision making in hierarchical organizations or
contracting networks with regard to problems of incentives and coordination. It starts by
describing incentive and coordination costs of delegation in simple canonical examples of
hierarchies where both information and incentives of different decisionmakers differ. One
class of models pertain to contexts where the classical Revelation Principle applies, i.e.,
where costs of contractual complexity, information processing, or communication are
absent, agents do not collude, and the mechanism designer can commit to the mechanism.
Delegation may conceivably entail a loss of control and coordination arising from the divergence
of information and incentives. Sufficient and necessary conditions for this loss to be
mitigated entirely include risk neutrality, top-down contracting, and monitoring of transfers
or production assignments between subordinates. The next class of models introduces
communication costs that restrict the performance of centralized arrangements relative to
delegation owing to a resulting loss of flexibility, which has to be traded off against possible
control losses of delegation. Finally, consequences of collusion among agents is discussed,
which typically enlarge the range of circumstances under which delegation can attain optimal
second-best outcomes. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of this
theoretical literature to recently emerging empirical studies of industrial organizations
where delegated decision making plays an important role: adoption of innovative human
resource management practices, new information technologies and retail franchising.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&article=2&issue_date=June 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.2.367</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&issue_date=June 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Schumpeter Redux: A Review of Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales's Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Richard</gnm><snm>Sylla</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>391</ppf>
<ppl>404</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists1 is an ambitious probe into capitalism's past,
present, and future. Whereas Joseph A. Schumpeter viewed capitalism as doomed
because it was losing its political and social supports, Rajan and Zingales see it more
as threatened from within by established or "incumbent" industrialists and financiers
who become enemies of free markets. The authors contend that free financial markets
foster economic progress while undermining the ability of incumbents to have their
way. Rajan and Zingales may overstate the significance of "the great reversal" of
financial development in the middle decades of the twentieth century, and their evidence
and interpretations are sometimes flawed. Nonetheless, they make a strong case
for the fundamental importance of financial development for economic modernization
and their warnings about the antimarket tendencies of incumbents are well worth
pondering.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&article=3&issue_date=June 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.2.391</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&issue_date=June 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Review of Steven Shavell's Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Richard A.</gnm><snm>Posner</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>405</ppf>
<ppl>414</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Steven Shavell's Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University
Press, 2004) is a major theoretical contribution to "law and economics," the applied
field of economics that studies the economic properties and consequences of legal doctrines
and institutions. It is a field of immense practical importance, but unfamiliar to
many economists--a situation that Shavell's book bids fair to rectify. This review
essay situates Shavell's book in the history of economic scholarship about law and uses
the book as a springboard for speculation about new directions in that scholarship.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&article=4&issue_date=June 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.2.405</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&issue_date=June 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Regular Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Review of Peter Isard's Globalization and the International Financial System: What's Wrong and What Can be Done?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Barry</gnm><snm>Eichengreen</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>415</ppf>
<ppl>419</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Peter Isard's recent book (Globalization and the International Financial System:
What's Wrong and What Can be Done?, Cambridge University Press, 2005) provides
a thoughtful and balanced review of the scholarly literature on the past operation and
potential reform of the international monetary and financial system. The author's
approach, from which much can be learned, is to draw lessons from the history of
exchange rates and capital flows and, especially, from the financial crises of the 1990s.
But this retrospective focus is also revealing of what is new and different about our
current international monetary and financial environment and in the ongoing debate
surrounding the future of its steward, the International Monetary Fund.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&article=5&issue_date=June 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.2.415</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&issue_date=June 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Book Review</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Book Reviews</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>420</ppf>
<ppl>461</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&article=6&issue_date=June 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.2.420</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&issue_date=June 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Back Matter</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Annotated Listing of New Books</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>461</ppf>
<ppl>570</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&article=7&issue_date=June 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.2.462</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>44</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&issue_date=June 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Back Matter</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>JEL Classification System</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>571</ppf>
<ppl>583</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=44&issue=2&article=8&issue_date=June 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.44.2.571</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


