<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Symposia</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resurgence</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Dale W.</gnm><snm>Jorgenson</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Mun S.</gnm><snm>Ho</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Kevin J.</gnm><snm>Stiroh</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>3</ppf>
<ppl>24</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>It is widely recognized that information technology was critical to the dramatic acceleration of U.S. labor productivity growth in the mid 1990s. This paper traces the evolution of productivity estimates to document how and when this perception emerged. Early studies concluded that information technology was relatively unimportant. Only after the massive information technology investment boom of the late 1990s did this investment and underlying productivity increases in the information technology–producing sectors come to be identified as important sources of growth. Although information technology has diminished in significance since the dot-com crash of 2000 and observed growth rates have slowed recently, we project that private sector productivity growth will average around 2.4 percent per year for the next decade, only moderately below the average of the post-1995 period.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.3</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Symposia</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Productivity Gap between Europe and the United States: Trends and Causes</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Bart</gnm><snm>van Ark</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Mary</gnm><snm>O'Mahoney</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Marcel P.</gnm><snm>Timmer</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>25</ppf>
<ppl>44</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Since the mid-1990s, labor productivity growth in Europe has significantly slowed compared to earlier decades. In contrast, labor productivity growth in the United States accelerated, so that a new productivity gap has opened up. This paper shows that this development is attributable to the slower emergence of the knowledge economy in Europe. We consider various explanations which are not mutually exclusive. These include lower growth contributions from investment in information and communication technology; the small share of information and communications technology–producing industries in Europe; and slower multifactor productivity growth, which proxies for advances in technology and innovation. Underlying these are issues related to the functioning of European labor markets and the high level of product market regulation in Europe. The paper emphasizes the key role of market service sectors in accounting for the productivity growth divergence between the two regions. We argue that improved productivity growth in Europe's market services will be needed to avoid a further widening of the productivity gap.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=2&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.25</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Symposia</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Accounting for Growth: Comparing China and India</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Barry</gnm><snm>Bosworth</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Susan M.</gnm><snm>Collins</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>45</ppf>
<ppl>66</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Since 1980, China and India have achieved remarkable rates of economic growth and poverty reduction. The emergence of China and India as major forces in the global economy has been one of the most significant economic developments of the past quarter century. This paper examines sources of economic growth in the two countries, comparing and contrasting their experiences over the past 25 years. In this paper, we investigate patterns of economic growth for China and India by constructing growth accounts that uncover the supply-side sources of output change for each economy. Some of the results confirm themes that have emerged from the prior literature on the economic development of the two countries, however, some new findings emerge as well. In addition to decompositions of aggregate growth, we construct separate accounts for the three major economic sectors: agriculture; industry; and services. This level of detail enables us to highlight key differences in the development paths taken by China and India. In conclusion, we assess the prospects for future growth in each country.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=3&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.45</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Symposia</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Has Economic Analysis Improved Regulatory Decisions?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Robert W.</gnm><snm>Hahn</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Paul C.</gnm><snm>Tetlock</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>67</ppf>
<ppl>84</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In response to the increasing impact of regulation, several governments have introduced economic analysis as a way of trying to improve regulatory policy. This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of government-supported economic analysis of regulation. We find that there is growing interest in the use of economic tools, such as benefit–cost analysis; however, the quality of analysis in the U.S. and European Union frequently fails to meet widely accepted guidelines. Furthermore, the relationship between analysis and policy decisions is tenuous. To address this situation, we recommend pursuing an agenda in which economics plays a more central role in regulatory decision making. In addition, we suggest that prediction markets could help improve regulatory policy and improve measurement of the impact of regulation.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=4&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.67</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Symposia</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Is the Food And Drug Administration Safe And Effective?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Tomas J.</gnm><snm>Philipson</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Eric</gnm><snm>Sun</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>85</ppf>
<ppl>102</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides public oversight of the safety and efficacy of drugs; medical devices; biologics like vaccines and blood products; cosmetics; radiation-emitting electronic products; veterinary products;
and all foods, except meat and poultry (which are regulated by the Department of Agriculture). According to the FDA, the products it regulates account for more than one-fifth of U.S. consumer spending. In the area of medical products, the FDA is responsible for determining whether marketed products are both safe and effective before and after they have been marketed. In this paper, we will explore whether the policies of the agency itself are safe and effective. We stress two issues, one static and one dynamic. The static issue concerns the potential duplication inefficiency when product safety is protected not only by the FDA but also by the private sector through product liability law. Put another way, what is the rationale for using product liability and the FDA to regulate drug safety? While intuitively it may seem that two systems must be better than one in ensuring drug safety, each system comes with costs. We then turn to the dynamic issue, the speed–safety trade off, and consider the extent to which higher safety is achieved at a cost of later market entry of effective and even life-saving products. We assess the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts (PDUFAs), which increased the speed of the agency’s regulatory process starting in 1992, although according to some, at the cost of reducing drug safety. We conclude by suggesting a research agenda for future work on the Food and Drug Administration.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=5&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.85</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Symposia</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Optimal Abolition of FCC Spectrum Allocation</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Thomas W.</gnm><snm>Hazlett</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>103</ppf>
<ppl>128</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Ronald Coase based his 1959 call for spectrum markets on theoretical conjecture. Today abundant evidence supports his case. Targeted liberalization in cellular markets, as contrasted with regulatory planning of the digital TV transition and other traditional policies, suggest enormous efficiency gains are available from wider use of "the price system." With exclusive frequency rights assigned to owners, markets widely reconfigure spectrum use, coordinating complex spectrum sharing. Resulting social gains include increased consumer surplus from enhanced technological innovation and wireless service competition. A social bonus arrives in the benefits associated with wider scope for free speech. Yet, the administrative allocation system continues to distribute rents and garner political support. Liberal reforms, in contrast, produce large but broadly dispersed efficiency gains and are undersupplied. This paper proposes an incremental extension of property rights in spectrum to move beyond the current rent-seeking equilibrium, eliminating the Federal Communications Commission's centralized spectrum allocation process and, with it, an "attractive nuisance" generating anticonsumer outcomes.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=6&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.103</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Biological Measures of the Standard of Living</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Richard H.</gnm><snm>Steckel</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>129</ppf>
<ppl>152</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>When economists investigate long-term trends and socioeconomic differences in the standard of living or quality of life, they have traditionally focused on monetary measures such as gross domestic product—which has occupied center stage for over 50 years. In recent decades, however, scholars have increasingly recognized the limitations of monetary measures while seeking useful alternatives. This essay examines the unique and valuable contributions of four biological measures—life expectancy, morbidity, stature, and certain features of skeletal remains—to understand levels and changes in human well-being. People desire far more than material goods and in fact they are quite willing to trade or give up material things in return for better physical or psychological health. For most people, health is so important to their quality of life that it is useful to refer to the "biological standard of living." Biological measures may be especially valuable for historical studies and for other research circumstances where monetary measures are thin or lacking. A concluding section ruminates on the future evolution of biological approaches in measuring happiness.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=7&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.129</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Sluggish Institutions in a Dynamic World: Can Unions and Industrial Competition Coexist?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Barry T.</gnm><snm>Hirsch</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>153</ppf>
<ppl>176</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>During the 1930s and 1940s, collective bargaining emerged as the workplace governance norm in much of the U.S. industrial sector. Following its peak in the 1950s, union density in the U.S. private sector fell steadily, to only 7.4 percent in 2006. Governance shifted from a formalized union norm to one of constrained managerial discretion. In competitive and dynamic economic environments, a union tax on company earnings and slow response to economic shocks combine to produce poor performance by union companies. Two industries—automotives and airlines—are used to illustrate these points. If worker-based institutions are to flourish, they must add value and permit companies to perform at levels similar to those obtained under evolving nonunion governance norms.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=8&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.153</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Guaranteed Trouble: The Economic Effects of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jeffrey R.</gnm><snm>Brown</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>177</ppf>
<ppl>198</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>How did the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a government corporation created to insure the pensions of workers and retirees in bankrupt firms, end up facing financial distress of its own? How did an organization designed to strengthen retirement security
come to be seen as contributing to retirement insecurity? The superficial answer is that the PBGC's current funding problem arises from the decline in stock market prices in 2000, which reduced pension assets, and the fall in interest rates at about the same time, which boosted the present value of pension liabilities. But more fundamentally, much of the blame for the poor financial state of the PBGC, as well as the defined benefit system more generally, lies in some major design flaws of the PBGC pension insurance program. Specifically, the PBGC has: 1) failed to properly price insurance and thus encouraged excessive risk-taking by plan sponsors; 2) failed to promote adequate funding of pension obligations; and 3) failed to promote sufficient information disclosure to market participants. Together, these three flaws produced a system in which many firms fail to adequately fund their pension obligations, knowing that in financial distress, they can dump their pension liabilities onto the PBGC. Though the Pension Protection Act of 2006 made some progress in improving the PBGC program, it failed to correct these three major problems fully. Absent further reform, substantial problems will continue to plague the private defined benefit pension system in decades to come. To prevent this deterioration, this paper concludes that Congress should transfer much of the responsibility for defined benefit pension insurance to compulsory private markets.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=9&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.177</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Dispelling Some Misconceptions about Agricultural Trade Liberalization</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Stephen</gnm><snm>Tokarick</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>199</ppf>
<ppl>216</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>There has been a great deal of public discussion over the impact that agricultural trade liberalization would likely have, especially on low-income countries. Unfortunately, the public discussion has been characterized by a number of misconceptions. This paper provides a clarifying discussion of the issues involved. Among the key points addressed are 1) agricultural "subsidies" are not nearly as large as has been portrayed; 2) tariffs are actually far more distortionary than subsidies and some low-income countries actually benefit from rich country subsides; and 3) widespread tariff reductions will not inflict large damage on developing countries as a result of preference erosion. The case for removing agricultural trade barriers remains compelling, even without the exaggerations and misconceptions.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=10&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.199</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Features</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Markets: Ready-Mixed Concrete</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Chad</gnm><snm>Syverson</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>217</ppf>
<ppl>234</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Concrete's natural color is gray. Its favored uses are utilitarian. Its very ubiquity causes it to blend into the background. But ready-mix concrete does have one remarkable characteristic: other than manufactured ice, perhaps no other manufacturing industry faces greater transport barriers. The transportation problem arises because ready-mix concrete both has a low value-to-weight ratio and is highly perishable—it absolutely must be discharged from the truck before it hardens. These transportation barriers mean ready-mixed concrete must be produced near its customers. For the same reason, foreign trade in ready-mixed concrete is essentially nonexistent. This article is an introduction to the basics of the market for ready-mix concrete, focusing mainly on its consumers and its producers in the United States, but with occasional comparisons to other countries when contrasts are useful.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=11&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.217</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Features</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Recommendations for Further Reading</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Timothy</gnm><snm>Taylor</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>235</ppf>
<ppl>242</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=12&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.235</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Features</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Comments: Robert Solow, Murray Wiedenbaum, V. V. Chari, and Patrick J. Kehoe</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>243</ppf>
<ppl>250</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=13&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.243</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0895-3309</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Perspectives</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>22</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>Winter 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&issue_date=Winter 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Features</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Notes</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>251</ppf>
<ppl>252</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEP&volume=22&issue=1&article=14&issue_date=Winter 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jep.22.1.251</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


