<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>50</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=50&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty> </docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1</ppf>
<ppl>4</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.50.2.1</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.50.2.1</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>50</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=50&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Macroeconomics and the Term Structure</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Refet S.</gnm><snm>Gurkaynak</snm><aff>Bilkent U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jonathan H.</gnm><snm>Wright</snm><aff>Johns Hopkins U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>331</ppf>
<ppl>67</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper provides an overview of the analysis of the term structure of interest rates with a special emphasis on recent developments at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance. The topic is important to investors and also to policymakers, who wish to extract macroeconomic expectations from longer-term interest rates, and take actions to influence those rates. The simplest model of the term structure is the expectations
hypothesis, which posits that long-term interest rates are expectations of future average short-term rates. In this paper, we show that many features of the configuration of interest rates are puzzling from the perspective of the expectations hypothesis. We review models that explain these anomalies using time-varying risk premia. Although
the quest for the fundamental macroeconomic explanations of these risk premia is ongoing, inflation uncertainty seems to play a large role. Finally, while modern finance theory prices bonds and other assets in a single unified framework, we also consider an earlier approach based on segmented markets. Market segmentation seems important to understand the term structure of interest rates during the recent financial crisis. (JEL E31, E43, E52, E58)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.50.2.331</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.50.2.331</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>50</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=50&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Samuel</gnm><snm>Bowles</snm><aff>Santa Fe Institute and U Siena</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Sandra</gnm><snm>Polania-Reyes</snm><aff>U Siena and U College London</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>368</ppf>
<ppl>425</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Explicit economic incentives designed to increase contributions to public goods and to promote other pro-social behavior sometimes are counterproductive or less effective
than would be predicted among entirely self-interested individuals. This may occur when incentives adversely affect individuals' altruism, ethical norms, intrinsic motives to serve the public, and other social preferences. The opposite also occurs--crowding in--though it appears less commonly. In the fifty experiments that we survey, these effects are common, so that incentives and social preferences may be either substitutes (crowding out) or complements (crowding in). We provide evidence for four mechanisms that may account for these incentive effects on preferences: namely that incentives may (i) provide information about the person who implemented the incentive, (ii) frame the decision situation so as to suggest appropriate behavior, (iii) compromise a control averse individual's sense of autonomy, and (iv) affect the process by which people learn new preferences. An implication is that the evaluation of public policy must be restricted to allocations that are supportable as Nash equilibria when account is taken of these crowding effects. We show that well designed fines, subsidies, and the like minimize crowding out and may even do the opposite, making incentives and social preferences complements rather than substitutes. (JEL D02, D03, D04, D83, E61, H41, Z13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.50.2.368</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.50.2.368</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>50</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=50&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>What Does Human Capital Do? A Review of Goldin and Katz's <em>The Race between Education and Technology</em></ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Daron</gnm><snm>Acemoglu</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>David</gnm><snm>Autor</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>426</ppf>
<ppl>63</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Goldin and Katz's The Race between Education and Technology is a monumental
achievement that supplies a unified framework for interpreting how the demand and supply of human capital have shaped the distribution of earnings in the U.S. labor market over the twentieth century. This essay reviews the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of this work and documents the success of Goldin and Katz's framework in accounting for numerous broad labor market trends. The essay also considers areas where the framework falls short in explaining several key labor market puzzles of recent decades and argues that these shortcomings can potentially be overcome by relaxing the implicit equivalence drawn between workers' skills and their job tasks in the conceptual framework on which Goldin and Katz build. The essay argues that
allowing for a richer set of interactions between skills and technologies in accomplishing job tasks both augments and refines the predictions of Goldin and Katz's approach and suggests an even more important role for human capital in economic growth than indicated by their analysis. (JEL I20, J24, J31, O30)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.50.2.426</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.50.2.426</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>50</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=50&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Micro and Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Michael</gnm><snm>Keane</snm><aff>U New South Wales</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Richard</gnm><snm>Rogerson</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>464</ppf>
<ppl>76</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The response of aggregate labor supply to various changes in the economic environment is central to many economic issues, especially the optimal design of tax policies. Conventional wisdom based on studies in the 1980s and 1990s has long held that the analysis of micro data leads one to conclude that aggregate labor supply elasticities
are quite small. In this paper we argue that this conventional wisdom does not hold up to empirically reasonable and relevant extensions of simple life cycle models that served as the basis for these conclusions. In particular, we show that several pieces of conventional wisdom fail in the presence of human capital accumulation or labor supply decisions that allow for adjustment along both the extensive and intensive margin. We conclude that previous estimates of small labor supply elasticities based on micro data are fully consistent with large aggregate labor supply elasticities.
(JEL D91, E24, J22)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.50.2.464</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.50.2.464</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>50</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=50&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Forum: Do Consumers Need More Protection in Financial Markets?</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Consumer Protection and Contingent Charges</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Mark</gnm><snm>Armstrong</snm><aff>U Oxford</aff></au>
<au><gnm>John</gnm><snm>Vickers</snm><aff>U Oxford</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>477</ppf>
<ppl>93</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Contingent charges for financial services, such as fees for unauthorized overdrafts, are often controversial. We study the economics of contingent charges in a stylized setting with naive and sophisticated consumers. We contrast situations where the naive benefit from the presence of sophisticated consumers with situations where competition works to subsidize the sophisticated at the expense of the naive, arguably unfairly. The case for regulatory intervention in these situations depends in good part, but not only, on the weight placed on distributional concerns. The economic and legal issues at stake are well illustrated by a case on bank charges recently decided by the U.K. Supreme Court. (JEL D14, D18, G21, G28, L51)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.50.2.477</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.50.2.477</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>50</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=50&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Forum: Do Consumers Need More Protection in Financial Markets?</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Financial Advice</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Roman</gnm><snm>Inderst</snm><aff>Goethe U Frankfurt</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Marco</gnm><snm>Ottaviani</snm><aff>Bocconi U and Northwestern U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>494</ppf>
<ppl>512</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Financial advice could play an essential role in well-functioning markets for retail financial products, given that many consumers find it difficult to evaluate the complex
products on offer. However, conflicts of interest, which are pervasive in some parts of the industry, can turn advice into a curse rather than a blessing for consumers, especially
when consumers are not sufficiently wary. Through a simple model of financial advice, we overview the pros and cons of various policy interventions, such as imposing
mandatory disclosure, banning commissions, and regulating contract cancellation terms. (JEL D14, D18, G21, G28)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.50.2.494</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.50.2.494</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>50</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=50&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Book Reviews</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>513</ppf>
<ppl>46</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.50.2.513</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.50.2.513</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>50</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=50&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Annotated Listing of New Books</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>547</ppf>
<ppl>626</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.50.2.547</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.50.2.547</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>50</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=50&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>JEL Classification System</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>627</ppf>
<ppl>641</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.50.2.627</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.50.2.627</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


