<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Ugo</gnm><snm>Panizza</snm><aff>UNCTAD and Graduate Institute, Geneva</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Federico</gnm><snm>Sturzenegger</snm><aff>U Torcuato di Tella and Banco Ciudad</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jeromin</gnm><snm>Zettelmeyer</snm><aff>IMF and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>651</ppf>
<ppl>98</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper surveys the recent literature on sovereign debt and relates it to the evolution
of the legal principles underlying the sovereign debt market and the experience
of the most recent debt crises and defaults. It finds limited support for theories that
explain the feasibility of sovereign debt based on either external sanctions or exclusion
from the international capital market and more support for explanations that
emphasize domestic costs of default. The paper concludes that there remains a case
for establishing institutions that reduce the cost of default but the design of such
institutions is not a trivial task.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.3.651</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.3.651</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Saul</gnm><snm>Estrin</snm><aff>London School of Economics and IZA, Bonn</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jan</gnm><snm>Hanousek</snm><aff>Charles U Prague and CERGE-EI</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Evzen</gnm><snm>Kocenda</snm><aff>Charles U Prague and CERGE-EI</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jan</gnm><snm>Svejnar</snm><aff>U MI and CERGE-EI</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>699</ppf>
<ppl>728</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In this paper, we evaluate what we have learned to date about the effects of privatization
from the experiences during the last fifteen to twenty years in the postcommunist
(transition) economies and, where relevant, China. We distinguish separately
the impact of privatization on efficiency, profitability, revenues, and other indicators
and distinguish between studies on the basis of their econometric methodology in
order to focus attention on more credible results. The effect of privatization is mostly
positive in Central Europe, but quantitatively smaller than that to foreign owners
and greater in the later than earlier transition period. In the Commonwealth of
Independent States, privatization to foreign owners yields a positive or insignificant
effect while privatization to domestic owners generates a negative or insignificant
effect. The available papers on China find diverse results, with the effect of nonstate
ownership on total factor productivity being mostly positive but sometimes insignificant
or negative.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.3.699</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.3.699</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Antonio</gnm><snm>Estache</snm><aff>ECARES, Free U Brussels</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Liam</gnm><snm>Wren-Lewis</snm><aff>U Oxford</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>729</ppf>
<ppl>70</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is
crucial for growth and poverty reduction. However, recent reforms aimed at improving
the performance of these sectors have had limited success. Evidence suggests that,
in many instances, this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by
policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries.
This article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation
in these countries. At the heart of the survey is the work of Jean-Jacques Laffont,
who, in the last decade of his life, set about developing a theoretical framework for
regulation in developing countries. We consider the implications of his work, which
focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries. We then
discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling,
bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors.
We conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different
when institutions are weak. Overall, we find that an understanding of the institutional
context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework
for developing countries.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.3.729</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.3.729</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Review of Edward Luce's In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Lant</gnm><snm>Pritchett</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>771</ppf>
<ppl>80</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>India poses a development puzzle on a grand scale. Sixty years of electoral democracy,
thirty years of rapid growth, and a number of world class institutions (such as
the Institutes of Technology or Election Commission) have led to talk of India as a
superpower in a league with the United States and China. Yet, on many fronts, India's
indicators of human well-being (e.g., malnutrition, immunization) are at, or below,
those of much poorer sub-Saharan African countries. Measures of the administrative
capacity of the state on basics like attendance, performance, and corruption reveal
a potentially "flailing state" whose brilliantly formulated policies are disconnected
from realities on the ground. This review essay of Ed Luce's In Spite of the Gods
attempts to articulate the puzzle that is modern India and pose questions about the
development trajectory of a country whose fortunes will shape our century.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.3.771</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.3.771</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Finance and Politics: A Review Essay Based on Kenneth Dam's Analysis of Legal Traditions in The Law-Growth Nexus</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Mark J.</gnm><snm>Roe</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jordan I.</gnm><snm>Siegel</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>781</ppf>
<ppl>800</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Strong financial markets are widely thought to propel economic development, with
many in finance seeing legal tradition as fundamental to protecting investors sufficiently
for finance to flourish. Kenneth Dam finds that the legal tradition view inaccurately
portrays how legal systems work, how laws developed historically, and how
government power is allocated in the various legal traditions. Yet, after probing the
legal origins' literature for inaccuracies, Dam does not deeply develop an alternative
hypothesis to explain the world's differences in financial development. Nor does he
challenge the origins core data, which could be origins' trump card. Hence, his analysis
will not convince many economists, despite that his legal learning suggests conceptual
and factual difficulties for the legal origins explanations. Yet, a dense political
economy explanation is already out there and the origins-based data has unexplored
weaknesses consistent with Dam's contentions. Knowing if the origins view is truly
fundamental, flawed, or secondary is vital for financial development policy making
because policymakers who believe it will pick policies that imitate what they think
to be the core institutions of the preferred legal tradition. But if they have mistaken
views, as Dam indicates they might, as to what the legal traditions' institutions really
are and which types of laws are effective, or what is really most important to financial
development, they will make policy mistakes -- potentially serious ones.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.3.781</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.3.781</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Book Reviews</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>801</ppf>
<ppl>60</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.3.801</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.3.801</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>647</ppf>
<ppl>650</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.3.647</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.3.647</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Annotated Listing of New Books</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>861</ppf>
<ppl>963</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.3.861</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.3.861</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>JEL Classification System</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>964</ppf>
<ppl>977</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.3.964</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.3.964</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


