<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>313</ppf>
<ppl>314</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.2.313</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.2.313</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Stefano</gnm><snm>DellaVigna</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>315</ppf>
<ppl>72</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The research in Psychology and Economics (a.k.a. Behavioral Economics) suggests that
individuals deviate from the standard model in three respects: (1) nonstandard preferences,
(2) nonstandard beliefs, and (3) nonstandard decision making. In this paper, I
survey the empirical evidence from the field on these three classes of deviations. The
evidence covers a number of applications, from consumption to finance, from crime to
voting, from charitable giving to labor supply. In the class of nonstandard preferences,
I discuss time preferences (self-control problems), risk preferences (reference dependence),
and social preferences. On nonstandard beliefs, I present evidence on overconfidence,
on the law of small numbers, and on projection bias. Regarding nonstandard
decision making, I cover framing, limited attention, menu effects, persuasion and
social pressure, and emotions. I also present evidence on how rational actors -- firms,
employers, CEOs, investors, and politicians -- respond to the nonstandard behavior
described in the survey. Finally, I briefly discuss under what conditions experience
and market interactions limit the impact of the nonstandard features.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.2.315</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.2.315</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Can the West Save Africa?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>William</gnm><snm>Easterly</snm><aff>NYU</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>373</ppf>
<ppl>447</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In the new millennium, the Western aid effort toward Africa has surged due to writings
by well-known economists, a celebrity mass advocacy campaign, and decisions by
Western leaders to make Africa a major foreign policy priority. This survey contrasts
the predominant "transformational" approach (West comprehensively saves Africa) to
occasional swings to a "marginal" approach (West takes one small step at a time to help
individual Africans). Evaluation of "one step at a time" initiatives is generally easier than
that of transformational ones either through controlled experiments (although these have
been oversold) or simple case studies where it is easier to attribute outcomes to actions.
We see two themes emerge from the literature survey: (1) escalation -- as each successive
Western transformational effort has yielded disappointing results (as judged at least by
stylized facts, since again the econometrics are shaky), the response has been to try an
even more ambitious effort and (2) the cycle of ideas -- rather than a progressive testing
and discarding of failed ideas, we see a cycle in aid ideas in many areas in Africa, with
ideas going out of fashion only to come back again later after some lapse long enough to
forget the previous disappointing experience. Both escalation and cyclicality of ideas
are symptomatic of the lack of learning that seems to be characteristic of the "transformational"
approach. In contrast, the "marginal" approach has had some successes in
improving the well-being of individual Africans, such as the dramatic fall in mortality.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.2.373</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.2.373</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Gender Differences in Preferences</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Rachel</gnm><snm>Croson</snm><aff>U TX, Dallas</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Uri</gnm><snm>Gneezy</snm><aff>U CA, San Diego</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>448</ppf>
<ppl>74</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper reviews the literature on gender differences in economic experiments.
In the three main sections, we identify robust differences in risk preferences, social
(other-regarding) preferences, and competitive preferences. We also speculate on the
source of these differences, as well as on their implications. Our hope is that this
article will serve as a resource for those seeking to understand gender differences and
to use as a starting point to illuminate the debate on gender-specific outcomes in the
labor and goods markets.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.2.448</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.2.448</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Review of Michael Tomz's <em>Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries</em></ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Mark</gnm><snm>Gersovitz</snm><aff>Johns Hopkins U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>475</ppf>
<ppl>81</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Repudiation and expropriation pose obstacles to the international mobility of capital
and thereby to efficient international allocation of resources. Tomz discusses the determinants
of lending in the face of the threat of repudiation. Using history, he argues
that debtor countries have sought a reputation for compliance with loan agreements
to access future loans and that military or trade sanctions have been unimportant in
sustaining lending. He discusses when and why banks have been more active as lenders
relative to bondholders. This article situates Tomz's concerns in the broad themes
of thought on obstacles to capital mobility and evaluates his arguments.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.2.475</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.2.475</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Book Reviews</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>482</ppf>
<ppl>541</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.2.482</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.2.482</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Annotated Listing of New Books</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>542</ppf>
<ppl>634</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.2.542</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.2.542</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>47</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>June 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=JEL&volume=47&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>JEL Classification System</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>635</ppf>
<ppl>648</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.2.635</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/jel.47.2.635</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


