<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>41</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2003</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&issue_date=September 2003</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Auctions and the Price of Art</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Orley</gnm><snm>Ashenfelter</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Kathryn</gnm><snm>Graddy</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>763</ppf>
<ppl>787</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper contains a review of the burgeoning new research of the last decade that has been designed to shed light on how the art auction system works, what it indicates about price formation, and how well it performs. We begin with a short description of the mechanics of the auction system and then organize the remainder of our discussion around two major topics: how auction prices can be used to determine and compare overall price movements within the art market and with other markets; and how the auction mechanism influences prices. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&article=1&issue_date=September 2003</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/002205103322436188</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>41</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2003</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&issue_date=September 2003</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Forecasting Output and Inflation: The Role of Asset Prices</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>James H.</gnm><snm>Stock</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Mark</gnm><snm>W.Watson</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>788</ppf>
<ppl>829</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Are asset prices useful predictors of inflation and real output growth? After reviewing the large literature on this topic, we undertake an empirical analysis of quarterly data for seven OECD countries spanning 1959-99. The literature review and the empirical analysis yield the same conclusions. Some asset prices predict inflation or output growth in some countries in some periods. Which series predicts what, when, and where is difficult to predict; being a good predictor historically is largely unrelated to subsequent performance. Intriguingly, forecasts that combine these individually unstable forecasts appear to improve reliably upon univariate benchmarks. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&article=2&issue_date=September 2003</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/002205103322436197</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>41</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2003</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&issue_date=September 2003</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Ingo</gnm><snm>Vogelsang</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>830</ppf>
<ppl>862</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Without access of networks to each other, competition in the telecommunications sector would hardly have spread so quickly. Such mutual access is necessary for carriers to provide ubiquitous service and enable end-users to call and be called by anybody without subscribing to a system-wide monopolist. One-way access concerns bottleneck inputs provided by an incumbent network to entrants, while two-way access concerns the interconnection between networks. Whereas one-way access regulation is exclusively driven by containment of market power, two-way access is additionally affected by collusion possibilities. Among the numerous pricing rules discussed, none clearly dominates. This article provides a roadmap vis-a-vis the competing policy objectives for access price regulation. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&article=3&issue_date=September 2003</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/002205103322436205</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>41</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2003</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&issue_date=September 2003</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Marketization of New Zealand Schools: Assessing Fiske and Ladd</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Alan</gnm><snm>Woodfield</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Philip</gnm><snm>Gunby</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>863</ppf>
<ppl>884</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Edward Fiske and Helen Ladd's review of market-based educational reforms in New Zealand are assessed in light of recent developments. We agree that predicted benefits were overstated, that there were both losers and winners, and that educational nirvana did not result. In our view, however, the main impact was to make schools' problems more transparent, creating discomforting pressures and attempts to undermine this transparency. We examine responses to changes in zoning laws, the effects of socioeconomic status on observed outcomes, signalling and value-added behavior, and school accountability. We find that educational reforms produce substantial short-term changes, largely on the demand-side. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&article=4&issue_date=September 2003</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/002205103322436214</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>41</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2003</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&issue_date=September 2003</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Globalization and the Politics of International Finance: The Stiglitz Verdict</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Kaushik</gnm><snm>Basu</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>885</ppf>
<ppl>899</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>There are many "outsiders" who have written critiques of the global financial system. Insiders typically do not; they have too much to lose. What makes Stiglitz's book, Globalization and Its Discontents, unusual is that it is an insider's critique. This book sketches the unfairness of the global system and how institutions, like the IMF, perpetuate the asymmetries of power and wealth. Though the book provides a morally compelling account of recent global crises, and its plea that we must think about radical change is hard to dismiss, it does not break new analytical ground nor offer concrete suggestions of alternatives. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&article=5&issue_date=September 2003</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/002205103322436223</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>41</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2003</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&issue_date=September 2003</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Book Reviews</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>900</ppf>
<ppl>954</ppl>
</pp>
<ab> </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&article=6&issue_date=September 2003</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/002205103322436232</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>41</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2003</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&issue_date=September 2003</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Annotated Listing of New Books</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>955</ppf>
<ppl>1072</ppl>
</pp>
<ab> </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&article=7&issue_date=September 2003</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/002205103322436241</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0022-8282</issn>
<jrnti>Journal of Economic Literature</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/journal.html</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>41</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>September 2003</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&issue_date=September 2003</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>JEL Classification System</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1073</ppf>
<ppl>1084</ppl>
</pp>
<ab> </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=JEL&volume=41&issue=3&article=8&issue_date=September 2003</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/002205103322436250</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


