Regular Articles
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Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals (pp. 567-76)
Eric S. Maskin |
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But Who Will Guard the Guardians? (pp. 577-85)
Leonid Hurwicz |
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Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory (pp. 586-603)
Roger B. Myerson |
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The Time-Varying Volatility of Macroeconomic Fluctuations (pp. 604-41)
Alejandro Justiniano and Giorgio E. Primiceri |
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The Difference That CEOs Make: An Assignment Model Approach (pp. 642-68)
Marko Tervio |
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What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice (pp. 669-89)
Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin |
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Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies (pp. 690-712)
Cristina Arellano |
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Do Wealth Fluctuations Generate Time-Varying Risk Aversion? Micro-evidence on Individuals (pp. 713-36)
Markus K. Brunnermeier and Stefan Nagel |
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Temporary Investment Tax Incentives: Theory with Evidence from Bonus Depreciation (pp. 737-68)
Christopher L. House and Matthew D. Shapiro |
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How the Electoral College Influences Campaigns and Policy: The Probability of Being Florida (pp. 769-807)
David Stromberg |
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Income and Democracy (pp. 808-42)
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson and Pierre Yared |
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Do People Vote with Their Feet? An Empirical Test of Tiebout (pp. 843-63)
H. Spencer Banzhaf and Randall P. Walsh |
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Information Aggregation in Polls (pp. 864-96)
John Morgan and Phillip C. Stocken |
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Stability in Supply Chain Networks (pp. 897-923)
Michael Ostrovsky |
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Thar She Blows: Can Bubbles Be Rekindled with Experienced Subjects? (pp. 924-37)
Reshmaan N. Hussam, David Porter and Vernon L. Smith |
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Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2-Games (pp. 938-66)
Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura |
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Contracts, Hold-Up, and Exports: Textiles and Opium in Colonial India (pp. 967-89)
Rachel Kranton and Anand V. Swamy |
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Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory (pp. 990-1008)
Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson |
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Historical Property Rights, Sociality, and the Emergence of Impersonal Exchange in Long-Distance Trade (pp. 1009-39)
Erik O. Kimbrough, Vernon L. Smith and Bart J. Wilson |
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Credit Elasticities in Less-Developed Economies: Implications for Microfinance (pp. 1040-68)
Dean S. Karlan and Jonathan Zinman |
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Shorter Papers
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Reference-Dependent Preferences and Labor Supply: The Case of New York City Taxi Drivers (pp. 1069-82)
Henry S. Farber |
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The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market (pp. 1083-1102)
Jeffrey R. Brown and Amy Finkelstein |
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Estimates of the Impact of Crime Risk on Property Values from Megan's Laws (pp. 1103-27)
Leigh Linden and Jonah E. Rockoff |
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Ordering the Extraction of Polluting Nonrenewable Resources (pp. 1128-44)
Ujjayant Chakravorty, Michel Moreaux and Mabel Tidball |
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Strotz Meets Allais: Diminishing Impatience and the Certainty Effect (pp. 1145-62)
Yoram Halevy |
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Monetary Policy, Judgment, and Near-Rational Exuberance (pp. 1163-77)
James Bullard, George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja |
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Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection: Comment (pp. 1178-88)
Arthur J. Robson and Balazs Szentes |
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Matching with Contracts: Comment (pp. 1189-94)
John William Hatfield and Fuhito Kojima |
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When Does Coordination Require Centralization? Corrigendum (pp. 1195-96)
Ricardo Alonso, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek |
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Independent Auditors' Report (pp. 1197-1205)
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