American Economic Review
Vol. 96 No. 4 September 2006
Find articles in this issue
An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima
(pp. 929-937)
Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market
(pp. 938-958)
Higher-Education Policies and the College Wage Premium: Cross-State Evidence from the 1990s
(pp. 959-987)
What Mean Impacts Miss: Distributional Effects of Welfare Reform Experiments
(pp. 988-1012)
Taxes, Cigarette Consumption, and Smoking Intensity
(pp. 1013-1028)
The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation
(pp. 1029-1042)
Costly Information Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model
(pp. 1043-1068)
Individual Preferences, Monetary Gambles, and Stock Market Participation: A Case for Narrow Framing
(pp. 1069-1090)
A Model of Forum Shopping
(pp. 1091-1113)
Cardinality versus Ordinality: A Suggested Compromise
(pp. 1114-1136)
Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations
(pp. 1137-1158)
Speculative Growth: Hints from the U.S. Economy
(pp. 1159-1192)
Shocks and Government Beliefs: The Rise and Fall of American Inflation
(pp. 1193-1224)
Traditional Institutions Meet the Modern World: Caste, Gender, and Schooling Choice in a Globalizing Economy
(pp. 1225-1252)
$1,000 Cash Back: The Pass-Through of Auto Manufacturer Promotions
(pp. 1253-1270)
A Theory of Participation in Elections
(pp. 1271-1282)
What is Discrimination? Gender in the American Economic Association, 1935-2004
(pp. 1283-1292)
Stock Prices, News, and Economic Fluctuations
(pp. 1293-1307)
Life-Cycle Variation in the Association between Current and Lifetime Earnings
(pp. 1308-1320)
Choice Shifts in Groups: A Decision-Theoretic Basis
(pp. 1321-1332)
Good Principals or Good Peers? Parental Valuation of School Characteristics, Tiebout Equilibrium, and the Incentive Effects of Competition among Jurisdictions
(pp. 1333-1350)
Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment
(pp. 1351-1354)
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply
(pp. 1355-1360)
Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment
(pp. 1361-1366)
Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly: Corrigendum
(p. 1367)