# Taking No Chances: Lender Monitoring and Corporate Acquisitions

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Lender Mergers and M&A

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#### Motivation



- Relative lack of empirical evidence on lender monitoring despite an extensive theoretical discussion (Shleifer and Vishny,1997;Nini et al.,2012)
- Existing empirical studies on creditor governance focus on the loan covenant setting (Nini et al.,2009,2012;Denis and Wang,2014;Ferreira et al.,2018)

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- Existing empirical studies on creditor governance focus on the loan covenant setting (Nini et al.,2009,2012;Denis and Wang,2014;Ferreira et al.,2018)
- Beyond contractual provisions, lenders monitor regularly to stay informed and make efficient resolution decisions (e.g.Diamond,1984,1991;Fama,1985;Rajan and Winton,1995)
- Evidence of active non-covenant-based monitoring (Gustafson et al.,2020)
  borrower meetings, site visits, demanding information on a monthly, even daily basis

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  borrower meetings, site visits, demanding information on a monthly, even daily basis
- Strong positive association with lead lender's "skin in the game"

#### What This Paper Does



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#### Research Question

### What This Paper Does



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- Bank mergers are mainly driven by regulatory changes, development in information technology, business strategy reasons such as market penetration (Harford, 2005; Javaraman et al., 2002)

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- Lender merger ↑ skin in the game→increased incentive to monitor (Sufi,2007;Ivashina,2009)
- A more concentrated loan stake ↓ coordination problem with other lenders→↑bargaining power when renegotiating with the manager (Chu,2019)

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


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- A more concentrated loan stake ↓ coordination problem with other lenders→↑bargaining power when renegotiating with the manager (Chu,2019)
- Enhanced lender monitoring disciplines managers from taking risky actions

## **DID Sample**





- Bank-specific borrower selection standards
- Market power to command higher loan pricing after merger, economies of scale, etc.


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Results

#### Treatment Effect on Public Takeover Activities





- The effect is solely driven by lender mergers involving a lead lender
- The effect is stronger for firms that are less subject to bank scrutiny and more prone to risk-taking

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Results

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- Deals that do happen target firms with more cash holdings, and lower cash flow volatility
- Deals that do happen on average create no additional shareholder value

#### Conclusion



- Exogenous increases in lead lender "skin in the game" reduce borrowers' public takeover activities
- Cross-sectional results suggest that this link is associated with intensified lender monitoring over managerial discretion
- Managers are more likely to play it safe amid intensified lender monitoring, leading to over-conservative firm policies that are mainly appealing to creditors, but can forgo good growth opportunities for shareholders

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