This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

The AEA website will be offline for brief scheduled maintenance after 6:00pm (EDT) this evening.
  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Review
  4. February 2018
  5. An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply

An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply

  • Lawrence M. Ausubel
American Economic Review
vol. 108, no. 2, February 2018
(pp. 561-63)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

In a comment, Okamoto (2018) identifies and corrects a misspecification of the rationing rule in Ausubel (2004). This reply elaborates on the observation that the optimality of truthful bidding in dynamic auctions may be sensitive to the fine details of the rationing rule. It then discusses the wider role of sequential bid processing in restoring truthful bidding.

Citation

Ausubel, Lawrence M. 2018. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply." American Economic Review, 108 (2): 561-63. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171408

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions