AER Contents: Previous Issues

We use scanner data and time diaries to document how households substitute time for money through shopping and home production. We document substantial heterogeneity in prices paid for identical goods for the same area and time, with older households shopping the most and paying the lowest prices. Doubling shopping frequency lowers a good's price by 7 to 10 percent. We estimate the shopper's price of time and use this series to estimate an elasticity of substitution between time and goods in home production of roughly 1.8. The observed life-cycle time allocation implies a consumption series that differs markedly from expenditures. (JEL D12, D91)

Theft, Gift-Giving, and Trustworthiness: Honesty Is Its Own Reward in Rural Paraguay
Laura Schechter

Abstract

In developing countries lacking legal enforcement, villagers may use implicit contracts to minimize crime. I construct a dynamic limited-commitment model, in which a thief cannot commit to forego stealing, but is induced to steal less by the promise of future gifts. Combining survey data on production, theft, gifts, and trust with experiments measuring trustworthiness, I provide supporting evidence. Farmers living near more relatives or with plots that are difficult to steal from give fewer gifts and trust more, and those living near more relatives also experience less theft. Giving increases when trust is lower and the threat of theft is greater. (JEL D86, K42, O17, Z13)

Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Foster Care
Joseph J. Doyle Jr.

Abstract

Little is known about the effects of placing children who are abused or neglected into foster care. This paper uses the placement tendency of child protection investigators as an instrumental variable to identify causal effects of foster care on long-term outcomes—including juvenile delinquency, teen motherhood, and employment— among children in Illinois where a rotational assignment process effectively randomizes families to investigators. Large marginal treatment effect estimates suggest caution in the interpretation, but the results suggest that children on the margin of placement tend to have better outcomes when they remain at home, especially older children. (JEL H75, I38, J13)

Trade Liberalization, Intermediate Inputs, and Productivity: Evidence from Indonesia
Mary Amiti and Jozef Konings

Abstract

This paper estimates the productivity gains from reducing tariffs on final goods and from reducing tariffs on intermediate inputs. Lower output tariffs can increase productivity by inducing tougher import competition, whereas cheaper imported inputs can raise productivity via learning, variety, and quality effects. We use Indonesian manufacturing census data from 1991 to 2001, which include plant-level information on imported inputs. The results show that a 10 percentage point fall in input tariffs leads to a productivity gain of 12 percent for firms that import their inputs, at least twice as high as any gains from reducing output tariffs. (JEL F12, F13, L16, O14, O19, O24)

Establishment Size Dynamics in the Aggregate Economy
Esteban Rossi-Hansberg and Mark L. J. Wright

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of establishment size dynamics based on the accumulation of industry-specific human capital that simultaneously rationalizes the economy- wide facts on establishment growth rates, exit rates, and size distributions. The theory predicts that establishment growth and net exit rates should decline faster with size, and that the establishment size distribution should have thinner tails, in sectors that use specific human capital less intensively. We establish that there is substantial cross-sector heterogeneity in US establishment size dynamics and distributions, which is well explained by relative factor intensities. (JEL L11 , L16, L25).

Demographics and Industry Returns
Stefano DellaVigna and Joshua M. Pollet

Abstract

How do investors respond to predictable shifts in profitability? We consider how demographic shifts affect profits and returns across industries. Cohort size fluctuations produce forecastable demand changes for age-sensitive sectors, such as toys, bicycles, beer, life insurance, and nursing homes. These demand changes are predictable once a specific cohort is born. We use lagged consumption and demographic data to forecast future consumption demand growth induced by changes in age structure. We find that demand forecasts predict profitability by industry. Moreover, forecast demand changes five to ten years in the future predict annual industry stock returns. One additional percentage point of annualized demand growth due to demographics predicts a 5 to 10 percentage point increase in annual abnormal industry stock returns. However, forecasted demand changes over shorter horizons do not predict stock returns. A trading strategy exploiting demographic information earns an annualized risk-adjusted return of approximately 6 percent. We present a model of inattention to information about the distant future that is consistent with the findings. We also discuss alternative explanations, including omitted risk-based factors. (JEL E21, G12, G32, J11, L11, L25)

Antitrust in Innovative Industries
Ilya Segal and Michael D. Whinston

Abstract

We study the effects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation. Antitrust policies that restrict incumbent behavior toward new entrants may have conflicting effects on innovation incentives, raising the profits of new entrants, but lowering those of continuing incumbents. We show that the direction of the net effect can be determined by analyzing shifts in innovation benefit and supply, holding the innovation rate fixed. We apply this framework to analyze several specific antitrust policies. We also show that, in some cases, the tension does not arise, and policies that protect entrants necessarily raise the rate of innovation. (JEL K21, L13, L14, L40, O30)

Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental "Hide-and-Seek" Games
Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri

Abstract

"Hide-and-seek" games are zero-sum two-person games in which one player wins by matching the other's decision and the other wins by mismatching. Although such games are often played on cultural or geographic "landscapes" that frame decisions nonneutrally, equilibrium ignores such framing. This paper reconsiders the results of experiments by Rubinstein, Tversky, and others whose designs model nonneutral landscapes, in which subjects deviate systematically from equilibrium in response to them. Comparing alternative explanations theoretically and econometrically suggests that the deviations are well explained by a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses based on "level-k" thinking, suitably adapted to nonneutral landscapes. (JEL C72, C92)

Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market
Paul J. Healy

Abstract

Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputation-building models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions. New experiments generate results in line with the FRE prediction, including final-period reversions to stage-game equilibrium and noncooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters. (JEL C72, C73, C78, J41)

Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment
Dean Karlan and John A. List

Abstract

We conducted a natural field experiment to further our understanding of the economics of charity. Using direct mail solicitations to over 50,000 prior donors of a nonprofit organization, we tested the effectiveness of a matching grant on charitable giving. We find that the match offer increases both the revenue per solicitation and the response rate. Larger match ratios (i.e., $3:$1 and $2:$1) relative to a smaller match ratio ($1:$1) had no additional impact, however. The results provide avenues for future empirical and theoretical work on charitable giving, cost-benefit analysis, and the private provision of public goods. (JEL D64, L31)

Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production
Yuliy Sannikov and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Abstract

We show that it is impossible to achieve collusion in a duopoly when (a) goods are homogenous and firms compete in quantities; (b) new, noisy information arrives continuously, without sudden events; and (c) firms are able to respond to new information quickly. The result holds even if we allow for asymmetric equilibria or monetary transfers. The intuition is that the flexibility to respond quickly to new information unravels any collusive scheme. Our result applies to both a simple stationary model and a more complicated one, with prices following a mean-reverting Markov process, as well as to models of dynamic cooperation in many other settings. (JEL D43, L12, L13)

Sequentially Rationalizable Choice
Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

Abstract

A sequentially rationalizable choice function is a choice function that can be retrieved by applying sequentially to each choice problem the same fixed set of asymmetric binary relations (rationales) to remove inferior alternatives. These concepts translate into economic language some human choice heuristics studied in psychology and explain cyclical patterns of choice observed in experiments. We study some properties of sequential rationalizability and provide a full characterization of choice functions rationalizable by two and three rationales. (JEL D01).

Vertical Control of Price and Inventory
Harish Krishnan and Ralph A. Winter

Abstract

This paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain. We consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets, which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand. Demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts. The price mechanism, in which each outlet pays a two-part price and chooses price and inventory, virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently. Contracts that can elicit first-best decisions include resale price floors or buy-back policies (retailer-held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers). (JEL D21, L13, L14, M11)

Individual Preferences for Giving
Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv and Daniel Markovits

Abstract

We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual- level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff- pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving from social preferences (trade-offs between the payoffs of others). And an intensive elaboration employs step-shaped sets to distinguish between behaviors that are compatible with well-behaved preferences and those compatible only with not well-behaved cases. (JEL C72, D64)

Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group
Bernard Caillaud and Jean Tirole

Abstract

The paper explores strategies that the sponsor of a proposal may employ to convince a qualified majority of members in a group to approve the proposal. Adopting a mechanism design approach to communication, it emphasizes the need to distill information selectively to key group members and to engineer persuasion cascades in which members who are brought on board sway the opinion of others. The paper shows that higher congruence among group members benefits the sponsor. The extent of congruence between the group and the sponsor, and the size and the governance of the group, are also shown to condition the sponsor's ability to get his project approved. (JEL D71, D72, D83)

Traders' Expectations in Asset Markets: Experimental Evidence
Ernan Haruvy, Yaron Lahav and Charles N. Noussair

Abstract

We elicit traders' predictions of future price trajectories in repeated experimental markets for a 15-period-lived asset. We find that individuals' beliefs about prices are adaptive, and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous markets in which they have participated. Most traders do not anticipate market downturns the first time they participate in a market, and, when experienced, they typically overestimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns occur. When prices deviate from fundamental values, belief data are informative to an observer in predicting the direction of future price movements and the timing of market peaks. (JEL C91, D12, D84, G11 )

Consistency and Heterogeneity of Individual Behavior under Uncertainty
Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Douglas Gale and Shachar Kariv

Abstract

By using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems, we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject. We test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis, and we estimate preferences using a two-parameter utility function based on Faruk Gul (1991). This specification provides a good interpretation of the data at the individual level and can account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the laboratory. The parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the population. (JEL D11, D14, D81, G11)

Shorter Papers

Heterogeneity and Aggregation: Implications for Labor-Market Fluctuations
Yongsung Chang and Sun-Bin Kim

Abstract

We demonstrate that aggregate employment and consumption can increase without a corresponding movement in productivity in a model with heterogeneous agents where the only aggregate disturbance is a productivity shock. The interaction between incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor results in a low employment-productivity correlation and creates a time-varying wedge between the marginal rate of substitution (for commodity consumption and hours) and productivity. Our results caution against viewing the measured wedge as an inefficiency due to a failure of labor-market clearing or as a fundamental driving force behind business cycles. (JEL D31, E32, J22, J24, J31)

Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts
Muriel Niederle

Abstract

Following the recently dismissed antitrust lawsuit against the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP), Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin (2006) propose a simple matching model in which firms set impersonal salaries simultaneously before matching with workers, which leads to lower aggregate wages than any competitive outcome. I model a feature of the NRMP, ordered contracts, that allows firms to set several contracts while determining the order in which they try to fill them, which has different properties than standard models with multiple contracts. Furthermore, the low wages of Bulow and Levin are no longer an equilibrium, but competitive wages are. (JEL D86, J31, J41)

Another Look at Airport Congestion Pricing
Steven A. Morrison and Clifford Winston

Abstract

We study alternate approaches to implement congestion pricing at US airports. Conventional formulations toll all aircraft without determining whether a plane operated by a given airline delays other planes that it operates or planes operated by other airlines. Recent work points out optimal pricing calls for carriers to be charged only for the delay they impose on other airlines. We find a small difference between the net benefits generated by the two congestion-pricing policies because the bulk of airport delays are not internalized and because the efficiency loss from pricing internalized congestion is small. (JEL L11, L93, R41)

Diamonds Are Forever, Wars Are Not: Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?
Massimo Guidolin and Eliana La Ferrara

Abstract

This paper studies the relationship between civil war and the value of firms in a poor, resource-abundant country using microeconomic data for Angola. We focus on diamond mining firms and conduct an event study on the sudden end of the conflict, marked by the death of the rebel movement leader in 2002. We find that the stock market perceived this event as "bad news" rather than "good news" for companies holding concessions in Angola, as their abnormal returns declined by 4 percentage points. The event had no effect on a control portfolio of otherwise similar diamond mining companies. This finding is corroborated by other events and by the adoption of alternative methodologies. We interpret our findings in light of conflict-generated entry barriers, government bargaining power, and transparency in the licensing process. (JEL D74, G32, O13, O17, Q34)

Overconfidence, Insurance, and Paternalism
Alvaro Sandroni and Francesco Squintani

Abstract

It is well known that when agents are fully rational, compulsory public insurance may make all agents better off in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of insurance markets. We find that when sufficiently many agents underestimate their personal risks, compulsory insurance makes low-risk agents worse off. Hence, behavioral biases may weaken some of the well-established rationales for government intervention based on asymmetric information. (JEL D82, G22)

The American Economic Review
Vol. 97, No. 5, December 2007

Contents

Articles

Shorter Papers

The American Economic Review Vol. 97, No. 5, December 2007

Contents

Articles

Shorter Papers

The American Economic Review
Vol. 97, No. 5, December 2007