AER Contents: Previous Issues

Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820–1992
François Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson

Abstract

This paper investigates the distribution of well being among world citizens during the last two centuries. The estimates show that inequality of world distribution of income worsened from the beginning of the 19th century to World War II and after that seems to have stabilized or to have grown more slowly. In the early 19th century most inequality was due to differences within countries; later, it was due to differences between countries. Inequality in longevity, also increased during the 19th century, but then was reversed in the second half of the 20th century, perhaps mitigating the failure of income inequality to improve in the last decades. (JEL D31, F0, N0, O0)

The Returns to Entrepreneurial Investment: A Private Equity Premium Puzzle?
Tobias J. Moskowitz and Annette Vissing-Jørgensen

Abstract

We document the return to investing in U.S. nonpublicly traded equity. Entrepreneurial investment is extremely concentrated, yet despite its poor diversification, we find that the returns to private equity are no higher than the returns to public equity. Given the large public equity premium, it is puzzling why households willingly invest substantial amounts in a single privately held firm with a seemingly far worse risk-return trade-off. We briefly discuss how large nonpecuniary benefits, a preference for skewness, or overestimates of the probability of survival could potentially explain investment in private equity despite these findings. (JEL G11, G12, M13)

Managing Dynamic Competition
Tracy R. Lewis and Huseyin Yildirim

Abstract

In many important high-technology markets, including software development, data processing, communications, aeronautics, and defense, suppliers learn through experience how to provide better service at lower cost. This paper examines how a buyer designs dynamic competition among rival suppliers to exploit learning economies while minimizing the costs of becoming locked in to one producer. Strategies for controlling dynamic competition include the handicapping of more efficient suppliers in procurement competitions, the protection and allocation of intellectual property, and the sharing of information among rival suppliers. (JEL C73, D44, L10)

Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts
Pierpaolo Battigalli and Giovanni Maggi

Abstract

In this paper we model contract incompleteness "from the ground up," as arising endogenously from the costs of describing the environment and the parties' behavior. Optimal contracts may exhibit two forms of incompleteness: discretion, meaning that the contract does not specify the parties' behavior with sufficient detail; and rigidity, meaning that the parties' obligations are not sufficiently contingent on the external state. The model sheds light on the determinants of rigidity and discretion in contracts, and yields rich predictions regarding the impact of changes in the exogenous parameters on the degree and form of contract incompleteness. (JEL D23, D8, L14)

Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation
Dilip Mookherjee and Debraj Ray

Abstract

Can historical wealth distributions affect long-run output and inequality despite "rational" saving, convex technology and no externalities? We consider a model of equilibrium short-period financial contracts, where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability. If agents have no bargaining power, poor agents have no incentive to save: poverty traps emerge and agents are polarized into two classes, with no interclass mobility. If instead agents have all the bargaining power, strong saving incentives are generated: the wealth of poor and rich agents alike drift upward indefinitely and "history" does not matter eventually. (D31, D91, I32, O17, Q15)

Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment
Daniel S. Nagin, James B. Rebitzer, Seth Sanders and Lowell J. Taylor

Abstract

Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation: employees are "rational cheaters," who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs. We investigate the "rational cheater model" by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism. A significant fraction of employees behave as the "rational cheater model" predicts. A substantial proportion of employees, however, do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer. (JEL D2, J2, L2, L8, M12)

Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry
Donald P. Morgan

Abstract

The pattern of disagreement between bond raters suggests that banks and insurance firms are inherently more opaque than other types of firms. Moody's and S&P split more often over these financial intermediaries, and the splits are more lopsided, as theory here predicts. Uncertainty over the banks stems from certain assets, loans and trading assets in particular, the risks of which are hard to observe or easy to change. Banks' high leverage, which invites agency problems, compounds the uncertainty over their assets. These findings bear on both the existence and reform of bank regulation. (JEL G20, G21, G28)

How Regional Blocs Affect Excluded Countries: The Price Effects of MERCOSUR
Won Chang and L. Alan Winters

Abstract

The welfare effects of PTAs are most directly linked to changes in trade prices, i.e., the terms of trade. This paper employs a simple strategic pricing game in segmented markets to measure the effects of MERCOSUR on the pricing of "nonmember" exports to Brazil: As Brazil exempts its MERCOSUR partners from tariffs, the resulting competitive pressure leads other exporters to reduce their prices. Working with detailed data on unit values and tariffs we find that the creation of MERCOSUR was associated with significant declines in the prices of nonmembers' exports to the region. (JEL F13, F15).

Testing Intertemporal Substitution, Implicit Contracts, and Hours Restriction Models of the Labor Market Using Micro Data
John C. Ham and Kevin T. Reilly

Abstract

We present new tests of three theories of the labor market: intertemporal substitution, hours restrictions, and implicit contracts. The intertemporal substitution test we implement is an exclusion test robust to many specification errors and we consistently reject this model. We model hours restrictions as part of an endogenous switching model. We compare the implicit probit equation to an unrestricted probit equation for unemployment and reject the hours restriction model. For the implicit contracts model, we estimate nonseparable within-period labor-supply and consumption equations. We test a cross-equation restriction of the model and cannot reject the implicit contracts model. (JEL E30, J22, J60)

Within a simple New Keynesian model emphasizing forward-looking behavior of private agents, I evaluate optimal nominal income growth targeting versus optimal inflation targeting. When the economy is mainly subject to shocks that do not involve monetary policy trade-offs for society, inflation targeting is preferable. Otherwise, nominal income growth targeting may be superior because it induces inertial policy making, which improves the inflation-output-gap trade-off. Somewhat paradoxically, inflation targeting may be relatively less favorable the more society dislikes inflation, and the more persistent are the effects of inflation-generating shocks. (JEL E42, E52, F58)

Did the Elimination of Mandatory Retirement Affect Faculty Retirement?
Orley Ashenfelter and David Card

Abstract

A special exemption from the 1986 Age Discrimination Act allowed colleges and universities to enforce mandatory retirement of faculty at age 70 until 1994. We construct a survey that permits us to compare faculty turnover rates before and after the law changed at a large sample of institutions with defined contribution pension plans. After the elimination of compulsory retirement the retirement rates of 70- and 71-year-olds fell by two-thirds and were comparable to rates of 69-year-olds. These findings indicate that U.S. colleges and universities will experience a rise in the number of older faculty over the coming years. (JEL J26, I21)

Geography of the Family
Kai A. Konrad, Harald Künemund, Kjell Erik Lommerud and Julio R. Robledo

Abstract

We study the residential choice of siblings who are altruistic towards their parents. The firstborn child's location choice influences the behavior of the second-born child and can shift some of the burden of providing care for the parents from one child to the other. These strategic considerations lead to an equilibrium location pattern with firstborn children locating further away from their parents than second-born children. We also analyze the location choices empirically using German data. These data confirm our theoretical predictions. (JEL H41, J10)

Longer-Term Effects of Head Start
Eliana Garces, Duncan Thomas and Janet Currie

Abstract

Specially collected data on adults in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics are used to provide evidence on the longer-term effects of Head Start, an early intervention program for poor preschool-age children. Whites who attended Head Start are, relative to their siblings who did not, significantly more likely to complete high school, attend college, and possibly have higher earnings in their early twenties. African-Americans who participated in Head Start are less likely to have been booked or charged with a crime. There is some evidence of positive spillovers from older Head Start children to their younger siblings. (JEL J24, I38)

Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet
Alvin E. Roth and Axel Ockenfels

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The American Economic Review Vol. 92, No. 4, September 2002

Contents

The American Economic Review
Vol. 92, No. 4, September 2002