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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics: Vol. 2 No. 2 (May 2010)

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Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games

Article Citation

Pavan, Alessandro, and Giacomo Calzolari. 2010. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(2): 132-90.

DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.2.132

Abstract

We introduce new revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency games which, although they do not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, do facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes that are typically of interest in applications. We then show how these mechanisms can be used in applications such as menu auctions, competition in nonlinear tariffs, and moral hazard settings. Lastly, we show how one can enrich the revelation mechanisms, albeit at a cost of an increase in complexity, to characterize all possible equilibrium outcomes, including those sustained by non-Markov strategies and/or mixed-strategy profiles. (JEL C72, D82, D86)

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Authors

Pavan, Alessandro (Northwestern U)
Calzolari, Giacomo (U Bologna)

JEL Classifications

C72: Noncooperative Games
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory

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