Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 2,
no. 1, February 2010
(pp. 150-82)
Abstract
This paper studies a monopoly pricing problem when the seller can choose the timing of a trade with each buyer, and a buyer's valuation of the seller's good is the weighted sum of his and other buyers' private signals. We show that it is optimal for the seller to employ a sequential scheme that trades with one buyer at a time and allows each buyer to observe the outcomes of all preceding transactions. We also identify conditions under which the seller optimally trades with the buyers in the increasing order of the weights they place on other buyers' signals. (JEL D42, D82, L12)Citation
Aoyagi, Masaki. 2010. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2 (1): 150-82. DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.1.150Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D42 Market Structure and Pricing: Monopoly
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
- L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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