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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics: Vol. 1 No. 2 (August 2009)
AEJ: Micro Volume. 1, Issue 2 | 
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AEJ: Micro Forthcoming Articles
Assignment Messages and Exchanges
Article Citation
Milgrom, Paul. 2009. "Assignment Messages and Exchanges."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
1(2): 95-113.
DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.2.95
DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.2.95
Abstract
"Assignment messages" are maximally general messages to describe
substitutable preferences by means of a linear program. With "integer
assignment messages," there exist integer-valued Walrasian allocations,
extending a result of Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik
(1971). Any pure Nash equilibrium profile of the Walrasian mechanism
with participants limited to assignment messages is also a Nash
equilibrium of the unrestricted Walrasian mechanism. Assignment
exchanges are generalizations of single-product double auctions
and are related to ascending multi-product clock auctions and the
Vickrey mechanism. Assignment messages also have additional
applications in mechanism design. (JEL D44, D82)
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Authors
Milgrom, Paul (Stanford U)
JEL Classifications
D44: Auctions
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
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