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Journal of Economic Perspectives: Vol. 15 No. 2 (Spring 2001)
JEP Volume. 15, Issue 2 |
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Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s
Article Citation
Holmstrom, Bengt, and
Steven N. Kaplan. 2001. "Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s."
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
15(2): 121-144.
DOI: 10.1257/jep.15.2.121
DOI: 10.1257/jep.15.2.121
Abstract
This paper describes and considers explanations for changes in corporate governance and merger activity in the United States since 1980. Corporate governance in the 1980s was dominated by intense merger activity distinguished by the prevalence of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and hostility. After a brief decline in the early 1990s, substantial merger activity resumed in the second half of the decade, while LBOs and hostility did not. Instead, internal corporate governance mechanisms appear to have played a larger role in the 1990s. We conclude by considering whether these changes and the movement toward shareholder value are likely to be permanent.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
Authors
Holmstrom, Bengt (MIT and NBER)
Kaplan, Steven N. (U Chicago and NBER)
Kaplan, Steven N. (U Chicago and NBER)
JEL Classifications
G34: Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
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