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Journal of Economic Perspectives: Vol. 10 No. 3 (Summer 1996)
JEP Volume. 10, Issue 3 | 
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Cheap Talk
Article Citation
Farrell, Joseph, and
Matthew Rabin. 1996. "Cheap Talk."
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
10(3): 103-118.
DOI: 10.1257/jep.10.3.103
DOI: 10.1257/jep.10.3.103
Abstract
Economists often ask how private information is shared through markets, costly signaling, and other mechanisms. Yet most information sharing is done through ordinary, informal talk. Economists are inconsistent in their view of such 'cheap talk': sometimes it is supposed that communication generally leads to efficient equilibria; other times it is supposed that since 'talk is cheap,' it is never credible. The authors think both views are wrong. In this paper, they describe what some recent research in game theory teaches about when people will convey private information by cheap talk.
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Full-text Article (Complimentary)
Authors
Farrell, Joseph (U CA, Berkeley and Federal Communications Commission)
Rabin, Matthew (U CA, Berkeley)
Rabin, Matthew (U CA, Berkeley)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
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