This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 99 No. 5 (December 2009)
AER Volume. 99, Issue 5 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Download Data Set (63.09 KB)
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
Peer-Induced Fairness in Games
Article Citation
Ho, Teck-Hua, and
Xuanming Su. 2009. "Peer-Induced Fairness in Games."
American Economic Review,
99(5): 2022-49.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.2022
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.2022
Abstract
People exhibit peer-induced fairness concerns when they look to their peers as
a reference to evaluate their endowments. We analyze two independent ultimatum
games played sequentially by a leader and two followers. With peer-induced
fairness, the second follower is averse to receiving less than the first
follower. Using laboratory experimental data, we estimate that peer-induced
fairness between followers is two times stronger than distributional fairness
between leader and follower. Allowing for heterogeneity, we find that 50 percent
of subjects are fairness-minded. We discuss how peer-induced fairness
might limit price discrimination, account for low variability in CEO compensation,
and explain pattern bargaining. (JEL C72, D63 )
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (63.09 KB)
Authors
Ho, Teck-Hua (U CA, Berkeley)
Su, Xuanming (U CA, Berkeley)
Su, Xuanming (U CA, Berkeley)
JEL Classifications
C72: Noncooperative Games
D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
