This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window

American Economic Review: Vol. 99 No. 1 (March 2009)

Expand

Quick Tools:

Print Article Summary
Export Citation
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER Forthcoming Articles

Cognition and Incomplete Contracts

Article Citation

Tirole, Jean. 2009. "Cognition and Incomplete Contracts." American Economic Review, 99(1): 265-94.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.1.265

Abstract

Thinking about contingencies, designing covenants, and seeing through their implications is costly. Parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete. The paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design. (JEL D23, D82, D86, L22)

Article Full-Text Access

Full-text Article

Authors

Tirole, Jean (Toulouse School of Economics)

JEL Classifications

D23: Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
L22: Firm Organization and Market Structure


American Economic Review


Quick Tools:

Sign up for Email Alerts

Follow us on Twitter

Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER - Forthcoming Articles

Virtual Field Journals


AEA Member Login:


AEAweb | AEA Journals | Contact Us