This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 98 No. 5 (December 2008)
AER Volume. 98, Issue 5 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Download Data Set (18.46 MB)
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence
Article Citation
Broda, Christian,
Nuno Limao, and
David E. Weinstein. 2008. "Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence."
American Economic Review,
98(5): 2032-65.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.5.2032
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.5.2032
Abstract
We find that prior to World Trade Organization membership, countries set
import tariffs 9 percentage points higher on inelastically supplied imports
relative to those supplied elastically. The magnitude of this effect is similar to
the size of average tariffs in these countries, and market power explains more of
the tariff variation than a commonly used political economy variable. Moreover,
US trade restrictions not covered by the WTO are significantly higher on goods
where the United States has more market power. We find strong evidence that
these importers have market power and use it in setting noncooperative trade
policy. (JEL F12, F13)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (18.46 MB)
Authors
Broda, Christian (U Chicago)
Limao, Nuno (U MD)
Weinstein, David E. (Columbia U)
Limao, Nuno (U MD)
Weinstein, David E. (Columbia U)
JEL Classifications
F12: Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
F13: Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
F13: Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
