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American Economic Review: Vol. 98 No. 4 (September 2008)
AER Volume. 98, Issue 4 | 
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Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism
Article Citation
Pathak, Parag A., and
Tayfun Sönmez. 2008. "Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism."
American Economic Review,
98(4): 1636-52.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.4.1636
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.4.1636
Abstract
Empirical and experimental evidence suggests different levels of sophistication among families in the Boston Public School student assignment plan. We analyze the preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism with sincere players who report their true preferences and sophisticated players who play a best response. We characterize the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes as the set of stable matchings of a modified economy, where sincere students lose priority to sophisticated students. Any sophisticated student weakly prefers her assignment under the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium of the Boston mechanism to her assignment under the recently adopted student-optimal stable mechanism. (JEL D82, I21)
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Authors
Pathak, Parag A. (Harvard U)
Sönmez, Tayfun (Boston College)
Sönmez, Tayfun (Boston College)
JEL Classifications
I21: Analysis of Education
I28: Education: Government Policy
I28: Education: Government Policy
