What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
Erdil, Aytek, and
Haluk Ergin. 2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice."
American Economic Review,
In several school choice districts in the United States, the student
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in
priority orders are broken in some exogenous way. Although such a
tie-breaking procedure preserves stability, it adversely affects the
welfare of the students since it introduces artificial stability
constraints. Our main finding is a polynomial-time algorithm for the
computation of a student-optimal stable matching when priorities are weak.
The idea behind our construction relies on a new notion which we call a
stable improvement cycle. We also investigate the strategic properties of
the student-optimal stable mechanism.
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Erdil, Aytek (Nuffield College, U Oxford)
Ergin, Haluk (Washington U in Saint Louis)
I28: Education: Government Policy
H75: State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
I21: Analysis of Education