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American Economic Review: Vol. 97 No. 5 (December 2007)

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Individual Preferences for Giving

Article Citation

Fisman, Raymond, Shachar Kariv, and Daniel Markovits. 2007. "Individual Preferences for Giving." American Economic Review, 97(5): 1858-1876.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1858

Abstract

We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual- level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff- pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving from social preferences (trade-offs between the payoffs of others). And an intensive elaboration employs step-shaped sets to distinguish between behaviors that are compatible with well-behaved preferences and those compatible only with not well-behaved cases. (JEL C72, D64)

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Authors

Fisman, Raymond
Kariv, Shachar
Markovits, Daniel


American Economic Review


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