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American Economic Review: Vol. 97 No. 4 (September 2007)

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Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment

Article Citation

Filiz-Ozbay, Emel, and Erkut Y. Ozbay. 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment." American Economic Review, 97(4): 1407-1418.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.4.1407

Abstract

This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first-price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret (felt when bidders lose at an affordable price). Different information structures are created to elicit regret: bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose (loser regret condition); or the second-highest bid if they win (winner regret condition); or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids. Bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid. However, bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret. (JEL D44)

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Filiz-Ozbay, Emel
Ozbay, Erkut Y.


American Economic Review


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