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American Economic Review: Vol. 97 No. 3 (June 2007)
AER Volume. 97, Issue 3 | 
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Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
Article Citation
Roth, Alvin E.,
Tayfun Sönmez, and
M. Utku Ünver. 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences."
American Economic Review,
97(3): 828-851.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.3.828
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.3.828
Abstract
Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them
because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can
exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence
of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way
exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be
arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a
general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges
required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types. (JEL C78, I12)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
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Download Data Set (67.09 KB) | Link to Appendix (104.15 KB)
Authors
Roth, Alvin E.
Sönmez, Tayfun
Ünver, M. Utku
Sönmez, Tayfun
Ünver, M. Utku
