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American Economic Review: Vol. 96 No. 3 (June 2006)
AER Volume. 96, Issue 3 | 
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Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete
Article Citation
Fumagalli, Chiara, and
Massimo Motta. 2006. "Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete."
American Economic Review,
96(3): 785-795.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.3.785
DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.3.785
Abstract
Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might prevent entry of a more efficient competitor by exploiting externalities among buyers. We show that their results hold only when downstream competition among buyers is weak. Under fierce downstream competition, if entry took place, a free buyer would become more competitive and increase its output and profits at the expense of buyers that sign an exclusive deal with the incumbent. Anticipating that orders from a single buyer would trigger entry, no buyer will sign the exclusive deal and entry will occur. This result is robust across different specifications of the game. (JEL: K21, L12, L42)
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Authors
Fumagalli, Chiara
Motta, Massimo
Motta, Massimo
