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American Economic Review: Vol. 91 No. 5 (December 2001)
AER Volume. 91, Issue 5 | 
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Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees
Article Citation
Li, Hao,
Sherwin Rosen, and
Wing Suen. 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees."
American Economic Review,
91(5): 1478-1497.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.5.1478
DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.5.1478
Abstract
Committees improve decisions by pooling members' independent information, but promote manipulation, obfuscation, and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences. Committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting. This coarsens the transmission of information, but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing. Each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on own information. Increased quality of one member's information results in his casting the crucial vote more often. Committees make better decisions for members than does delegation.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Li, Hao (U Toronto)
Rosen, Sherwin (Unlisted)
Suen, Wing (U Hong Kong)
Rosen, Sherwin (Unlisted)
Suen, Wing (U Hong Kong)
JEL Classifications
D71: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
