This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window

American Economic Review: Vol. 91 No. 3 (June 2001)

Expand

Quick Tools:

Print Article Summary
Export Citation
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER Forthcoming Articles

Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry

Article Citation

Chipty, Tasneem. 2001. "Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry." American Economic Review, 91(3): 428-453.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.3.428

Abstract

I examine the effects of vertical integration between programming and distribution in the cable television industry. I assess the effects of ownership structure on program offerings, prices, and subscriptions, and I compare consumer welfare across integrated and unintegrated markets. The results of this analysis suggest two general conclusions. First, integrated operators tend to exclude rival program services, suggesting that certain program services cannot gain access to the distribution networks of vertically integrated cable system operators. Second, vertical integration does not harm, and may actually benefit, consumers because of the associated efficiency gains.

Article Full-Text Access

Full-text Article

Authors

Chipty, Tasneem (Charles River Associates, Boston)

JEL Classifications

L82: Entertainment; Media
L22: Firm Organization and Market Structure


American Economic Review


Quick Tools:

Sign up for Email Alerts

Follow us on Twitter

Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER - Forthcoming Articles

Virtual Field Journals


AEA Member Login:


AEAweb | AEA Journals | Contact Us