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American Economic Review: Vol. 89 No. 5 (December 1999)
AER Volume. 89, Issue 5 | 
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Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets
Article Citation
Hendel, Igal, and
Alessandro Lizzeri. 1999. "Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets."
American Economic Review,
89(5): 1097-1115.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.5.1097
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.5.1097
Abstract
We present a dynamic model of adverse selection to examine the interactions between new and used goods markets. We find that the used market never shuts down, the volume of trade can be large, and distortions are lower than previously thought. New cars prices can be higher under adverse selection than in its absence. An extension to several brands that differ in reliability leads to testable predictions of the effects of adverse selection. Unreliable brands have steeper price declines and lower volumes of trade. We contrast these predictions with those of a model where brands physically depreciate at different rates.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Hendel, Igal (Princeton U and NBER)
Lizzeri, Alessandro (Princeton U)
Lizzeri, Alessandro (Princeton U)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
L15: Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
L15: Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
