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American Economic Review: Vol. 89 No. 4 (September 1999)
AER Volume. 89, Issue 4 | 
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The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
Article Citation
Roth, Alvin E., and
Elliott Peranson. 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design."
American Economic Review,
89(4): 748-780.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.4.748
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.4.748
Abstract
We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments show the theory provides good approximations. Furthermore, the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of "core convergence" result explains this; that each applicant interviews only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe engineering aspects of the design process.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Roth, Alvin E. (Harvard U)
Peranson, Elliott (National Matching Services, Inc)
Peranson, Elliott (National Matching Services, Inc)
JEL Classifications
J44: Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing
C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
I11: Analysis of Health Care Markets
C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
I11: Analysis of Health Care Markets
