This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window

American Economic Review: Vol. 103 No. 4 (June 2013)

Expand

Quick Tools:

Print Article Summary
Export Citation
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER Forthcoming Articles

A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections

Article Citation

Bouton, Laurent. 2013. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections." American Economic Review, 103(4): 1248-88.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.4.1248

Abstract

This paper analyzes the properties of runoff electoral systems when voters are strategic. A model of three-candidate runoff elections is presented, and two new features are included: the risk of upset victory in the second round is endogenous, and many types of runoff systems are considered. Three main results emerge. First, runoff elections produce equilibria in which only two candidates receive a positive fraction of the votes. Second, a sincere voting equilibrium does not always exist. Finally, runoff systems with a threshold below 50 percent produce an Ortega effect that may lead to the systematic victory of the Condorcet loser.

Article Full-Text Access

Full-text Article

Additional Materials

Authors

Bouton, Laurent (Boston U)

JEL Classifications

C72: Noncooperative Games
D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior


American Economic Review


Quick Tools:

Sign up for Email Alerts

Follow us on Twitter

Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER - Forthcoming Articles

Virtual Field Journals


AEA Member Login:


AEAweb | AEA Journals | Contact Us