This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window

American Economic Review: Vol. 102 No. 2 (April 2012)
AER Volume. 102, Issue 2 |
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Download Data Set (1.11 MB) | Online Appendix (919.66 KB)
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
Article Citation
Fudenberg, Drew,
David G. Rand, and
Anna Dreber. 2012. "Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World."
American Economic Review,
102(2): 720-49.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.2.720
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.2.720
Abstract
We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all
settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were "lenient" in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were "forgiving" in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment. (JEL C72, C73, D81)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (1.11 MB) | Online Appendix (919.66 KB)
Authors
Fudenberg, Drew (Harvard U)
Rand, David G. (Harvard U)
Dreber, Anna (Stockholm School of Economics)
Rand, David G. (Harvard U)
Dreber, Anna (Stockholm School of Economics)
JEL Classifications
C72: Noncooperative Games
C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D81: Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D81: Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

