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American Economic Review: Vol. 101 No. 4 (June 2011)
AER Volume. 101, Issue 4 | 
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Participation
Article Citation
Charness, Gary, and
Martin Dufwenberg. 2011. "Participation."
American Economic Review,
101(4): 1211-37.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.4.1211
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.4.1211
Abstract
We show experimentally that whether and how communication
achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context
depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in
a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns
of lies and truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but
otherwise completely ineffective. We examine the data in light of two
potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-fromblame.
(JEL D82, D83, Z13)
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Full-text Article
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Download Data Set (197.01 KB)
Authors
Charness, Gary (U CA, Santa Barbara and CESifo, U Munich)
Dufwenberg, Martin (U AZ and U Gothenburg)
Dufwenberg, Martin (U AZ and U Gothenburg)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Z13: Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Z13: Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
