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American Economic Review: Vol. 101 No. 3 (May 2011)

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Social Preferences and Fairness Norms as Informal Institutions: Experimental Evidence

Article Citation

Jakiela, Pamela. 2011. "Social Preferences and Fairness Norms as Informal Institutions: Experimental Evidence." American Economic Review, 101(3): 509-13.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.3.509

Abstract

We conduct a series of dictator games in which the status of the dictator relative to other players varies across treatments. Experiments are conducted in a conventional university lab and in villages in rural Kenya. We find that status is an important determinant of dictator game giving, but the relative importance of earned and unearned status differs across cultures.

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Authors

Jakiela, Pamela (Washington U in St Louis)

JEL Classifications

D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
O15: Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
O18: Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses; Transportation
Z13: Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification


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