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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 5 (December 2010)
AER Volume. 100, Issue 5 |
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Persuasion by Cheap Talk
Article Citation
Chakraborty, Archishman, and
Rick Harbaugh. 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk."
American Economic Review,
100(5): 2361-82.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2361
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2361
Abstract
We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multidimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker. We find that an expert with state-independent preferences can always make credible comparative statements that trade off the expert's incentive to exaggerate on each dimension. Such communication benefits the expert—cheap talk is "persuasive"—if her preferences are quasiconvex. Communication benefits a decision maker by allowing for a more informed decision, but strategic interactions between multiple decision
makers can reverse this gain. We apply these results to topics including product recommendations, voting, auction disclosure, and advertising. (JEL D44, D72, D82, D83, M37)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Online Appendix (66.54 KB)
Authors
Chakraborty, Archishman (York U)
Harbaugh, Rick (IN U)
Harbaugh, Rick (IN U)
JEL Classifications
D44: Auctions
D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
M37: Advertising
D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
M37: Advertising

