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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 5 (December 2010)

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Early Admissions at Selective Colleges

Article Citation

Avery, Christopher, and Jonathan Levin. 2010. "Early Admissions at Selective Colleges." American Economic Review, 100(5): 2125-56.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2125

Abstract

Early admissions are widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm. (JEL C78, I23)

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Authors

Avery, Christopher (Harvard U)
Levin, Jonathan (Stanford U)

JEL Classifications

C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
I23: Higher Education and Research Institutions


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