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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 2 (May 2010)

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Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions

Article Citation

Edelman, Benjamin, and Michael Schwarz. 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions." American Economic Review, 100(2): 597-602.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.2.597

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Additional Materials

Online Appendix (121.55 KB)

Authors

Edelman, Benjamin (Harvard U)
Schwarz, Michael (Yahoo! Labs, Berkeley, CA)

JEL Classifications

D44: Auctions
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
M37: Advertising


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