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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 1 (March 2010)
AER Volume. 100, Issue 1 |
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AER Forthcoming Articles
Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements
Article Citation
Lerner, Josh, and
Ulrike Malmendier. 2010. "Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements."
American Economic Review,
100(1): 214-46.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.214
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.214
Abstract
We analyze how contractibility affects contract design. A major concern when
designing research agreements is that researchers use their funding to subsidize
other projects. We show that, when research activities are not contractible, an
option contract is optimal. The financing firm obtains the option to terminate
the agreement and, in case of termination, broad property rights. The threat
of termination deters researchers from cross-subsidization, and the cost of
exercising the termination option deters the financing firm from opportunistic
termination. We test this prediction using 580 biotechnology research agreements.
Contracts with termination options are more common when research is
non-contractible. (JEL D86, L65, O31, O34)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (176.25 KB) | Appendix (592.42 KB)
Authors
Lerner, Josh (Harvard U)
Malmendier, Ulrike (U CA, Berkeley)
Malmendier, Ulrike (U CA, Berkeley)
JEL Classifications
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
L65: Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology
O31: Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
O34: Intellectual Property Rights
L65: Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology
O31: Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
O34: Intellectual Property Rights

