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  5. Evolution and Game Theory

Evolution and Game Theory

  • Larry Samuelson
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 16, no. 2, Spring 2002
(pp. 47-66)
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Abstract

Research in noncooperative game theory has focused attention on two questions: Should we expect equilibrium play? If so, which of the multiple equilibria that arise in many games should we expect? This paper summarizes recent approaches to these questions that have been based on evolutionary models.

Citation

Samuelson, Larry. 2002. "Evolution and Game Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (2): 47-66. DOI: 10.1257/0895330027256

JEL Classification

  • C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
  • B52 Current Heterodox Approaches: Institutional; Evolutionary
  • C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
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