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Journal of Economic Literature: Vol. 41 No. 3 (September 2003)

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Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks

Article Citation

Vogelsang, Ingo. 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks." Journal of Economic Literature, 41(3): 830-862.

DOI: 10.1257/002205103322436205

Abstract

Without access of networks to each other, competition in the telecommunications sector would hardly have spread so quickly. Such mutual access is necessary for carriers to provide ubiquitous service and enable end-users to call and be called by anybody without subscribing to a system-wide monopolist. One-way access concerns bottleneck inputs provided by an incumbent network to entrants, while two-way access concerns the interconnection between networks. Whereas one-way access regulation is exclusively driven by containment of market power, two-way access is additionally affected by collusion possibilities. Among the numerous pricing rules discussed, none clearly dominates. This article provides a roadmap vis-a-vis the competing policy objectives for access price regulation.

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Vogelsang, Ingo


Journal of Economic Literature


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