This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 93 No. 5 (December 2003)
AER Volume. 93, Issue 5 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards
Article Citation
Knittel, Christopher R., and
Victor Stango. 2003. "Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards."
The American Economic Review,
93(5): 1703-1729.
DOI: 10.1257/000282803322655509
DOI: 10.1257/000282803322655509
Abstract
We test whether a nonbinding price ceiling may serve as a focal point for tacit collusion, using data from the credit card market during the 1980's. Our empirical model can distinguish instances when firms match a binding ceiling from instances when firms tacitly collude at a nonbinding ceiling. The results suggest that tacit collusion at nonbinding state-level ceilings was prevalent during the early 1980's, but that national integration of the market reduced the sustainability of tacit collusion by the end of the decade. The results highlight a perverse effect of price regulation.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Knittel, Christopher R.
Stango, Victor
Stango, Victor
