This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 93 No. 3 (June 2003)
AER Volume. 93, Issue 3 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
Dynamic Speculative Attacks
Article Citation
Chamley, Christophe. 2003. "Dynamic Speculative Attacks ."
The American Economic Review,
93(3): 603-621.
DOI: 10.1257/000282803322157007
DOI: 10.1257/000282803322157007
Abstract
This paper presents a model of rational Bayesian agents with speculative attacks in a regime of exchange rate which is pegged within a band. Speculators learn from the observation of the exchange rate within the band whether their mass is sufficiently large for a successful attack. Multiple periods are necessary for the existence of speculative attacks. Various defense policies are analyzed. A trading policy by the central bank may defend the peg if it is unobserved and diminishes the market's information for the coordination of speculators.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Chamley, Christophe
