This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 93 No. 1 (March 2003)
AER Volume. 93, Issue 1 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions
Article Citation
Crawford, Vincent P. 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions ."
The American Economic Review,
93(1): 133-149.
DOI: 10.1257/000282803321455197
DOI: 10.1257/000282803321455197
Abstract
Starting from an example of the Allies' decision to feint at Calais and attack Normandy on D-Day, this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies. Allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players' responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless, noiseless messages. In some leading cases, the model has generically unique pure-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players, but are not themselves fooled. In others, the model has generically essentially unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players' strategies protect all players from exploitation.
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Crawford, Vincent P.
