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American Economic Journal: Economic Policy: Vol. 4 No. 3 (August 2012)
AEJ: Policy Volume. 4, Issue 3 |
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Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures
Article Citation
Aidt, Toke S., and
Julia Shvets. 2012. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures."
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
4(3): 1-29.
DOI: 10.1257/pol.4.3.1
DOI: 10.1257/pol.4.3.1
Abstract
We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public
services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator
channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less pork to their district when they cannot seek re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this last term reduction in funding is smaller in states with many legislative districts. (JEL D72, H70)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (1.09 MB) | Online Appendix (232.89 KB)
Authors
Aidt, Toke S. (U Cambridge and CESifo, Munich)
Shvets, Julia (U Cambridge)
Shvets, Julia (U Cambridge)
JEL Classifications
D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H70: State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
H70: State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
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