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American Economic Journal: Economic Policy: Vol. 3 No. 2 (May 2011)
AEJ: Policy Volume. 3, Issue 2 | 
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AEJ: Policy Forthcoming Articles
Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores
Article Citation
Alesina, Alberto,
Andrea Ichino, and
Loukas Karabarbounis. 2011. "Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores."
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
3(2): 1-40.
DOI: 10.1257/pol.3.2.1
DOI: 10.1257/pol.3.2.1
Abstract
Gender-based taxation (GBT ) satisfies Ramsey's rule because it taxes at a lower rate the more elastic labor supply of women. We study GBT in a model in which labor elasticities emerge endogenously from intrahousehold bargaining. We explore the cases of
superior bargaining power for men, higher male wages, and higher female home productivity. In all cases, men commit to a career in the market, take less home duties than women, and have lower labor supply elasticity. When society resolves its distributional concerns efficiently with gender-specific lump sum transfers, GBT with higher marginal tax rates on (single and married) men is optimal. (JEL D13, H21, H24, J16, J22)
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Authors
Alesina, Alberto (Harvard U and IGIER)
Ichino, Andrea (U Bologna)
Karabarbounis, Loukas (U Chicago)
Ichino, Andrea (U Bologna)
Karabarbounis, Loukas (U Chicago)
JEL Classifications
D13: Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
H21: Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H24: Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
J16: Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
J22: Time Allocation and Labor Supply
H21: Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H24: Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
J16: Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
J22: Time Allocation and Labor Supply
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