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American Economic Journal: Economic Policy: Vol. 1 No. 2 (August 2009)
AEJ: Policy Volume. 1, Issue 2 |
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Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance
Article Citation
Chetty, Raj. 2009. "Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance."
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
1(2): 31-52.
DOI: 10.1257/pol.1.2.31
DOI: 10.1257/pol.1.2.31
Abstract
Martin Feldstein's (1999) widely used taxable income formula for
deadweight loss assumes the marginal social cost of evasion and
avoidance equals the tax rate. This condition is likely to be violated
in practice for two reasons. First, some of the costs of evasion and
avoidance are transfers to other agents. Second, some individuals
overestimate the costs of evasion and avoidance. In such situations,
excess burden depends on a weighted average of the taxable income
and total earned income elasticities, with the weight determined by
the resource cost of sheltering income from taxation. This generalized
formula implies the efficiency cost of taxing high income individuals
is not necessarily large despite evidence that their reported
incomes are highly sensitive to marginal tax rates. (JEL H21, H24,
H26)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
Authors
Chetty, Raj (Harvard U)
JEL Classifications
H21: Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H24: Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
H26: Tax Evasion
H24: Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
H26: Tax Evasion
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