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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics: Vol. 5 No. 4 (November 2013)

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Strategic Tournaments

Article Citation

Arad, Ayala, and Ariel Rubinstein. 2013. "Strategic Tournaments." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(4): 31-54.

DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.31

Abstract

A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against all other players. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total G-payoff. The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction, and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We prove some general properties of the model and explore the intuition that a tournament encourages riskier behavior

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Authors

Arad, Ayala (U CA, Berkeley)
Rubinstein, Ariel (Tel Aviv U and NYU)

JEL Classifications

C72: Noncooperative Games
C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games

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