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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics: Vol. 4 No. 1 (February 2012)
AEJ: Micro Volume. 4, Issue 1 | 
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AEJ: Micro Forthcoming Articles
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
Article Citation
Hatfield, John William, and
Scott Duke Kominers. 2012. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
4(1): 176-208.
DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.1.176
DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.1.176
Abstract
We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not exhibit a supply chain structure, stable allocations need not exist. By contrast, in the presence of supply chain structure, a natural substitutability condition characterizes the maximal domain of firm preferences for which stable allocations are guaranteed to exist. Furthermore, the classical lattice structure, rural hospitals theorem, and one-sided strategy-proofness results all generalize to this setting. (JEL C78, D85, D86, L14)
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Authors
Hatfield, John William (Stanford U)
Kominers, Scott Duke (Becker Friedman Institute, U Chicago)
Kominers, Scott Duke (Becker Friedman Institute, U Chicago)
JEL Classifications
C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D85: Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
L14: Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
D85: Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
L14: Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
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